When I say “Only this is
seen”, I forget that a sentence may come over so natural
to us without having any use in the calculus of language.
Think of the law of identity,
“a = a”, and of
how we sometimes try hard to get hold of its sense, to visualize
it, by looking at an object and repeating to ourselves such a
sentence as “This tree is the same thing as this
tree”. The gestures and images by which I
apparently give this sentence sense are very similar to those which
I use in the case of “Only this is really
seen”. (To get clear about philosophical
problems, it is useful to become conscious of the apparently
unimportant details of the particular situation in which we are
inclined to make a certain metaphysical
assertion. Thus we may be tempted to
say “Only this is really seen” when we
stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we may not at all be
tempted to say this when we look about us 111. while walking.)
There is, as we have said, no objection to adopting a
symbolism in which a certain person always or temporarily holds an
exceptional place. And therefore, if I utter the
sentence “Only I really see”, it is
conceivable that my fellow creatures thereupon will arrange their
notation so as to fall in with me by saying
“so-and-so is really seen” instead of
“L.W. sees so-and-so”, etc.,
etc.. What however, is wrong is to think
that I can justify this choice of
notation. When I said, from my heart, that
only I see, I was also inclined to say that by
“I” I didn't really mean
L.W.,
although for the benefit of my fellow men I might say,
“It is now
L.W. who
really sees” though this is not what I really mean.
I could almost say that by “I”
I mean something which just now inhabits
L.W.,
something which the others can't see.
(I meant my mind, but could only point to it via my
body.) There is nothing wrong in suggesting that the
others should give me an exceptional place in their notation, but
the justification which I wish to give for it: that this body
is now the seat of that which really lives, ‒ ‒ ‒ is
senseless. For admittedly this is not to state anything
which in the ordinary sense is a matter of experience.
(And don't think that it is an
experiential proposition which only I can know
because only I am in the position to have the particular
experience.) Now the idea that the real I lives in my
body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word
“I”, and the misunderstandings 112. this grammar is liable to
give rise to. There are two different cases in the
use of the word “I” (or
“my”) which I might call “the use as
object” and “the use as subject”.
Examples of the first kind of use are these:
“My arm is broken”, “I have
grown six inches”, “I have a bump on my
forehead”, “The wind blows my hair
about”. Examples of the second kind are:
“I see so-and-so”,
“I hear so-and-so”,
“I try to lift my arm”,
“I think it will rain”,
“I have toothache”. One
can point to the difference between these two categories by
saying: The cases of the first category involve the
recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the
possibility of an error, or as I should rather put it:
The possibility of an error has been provided for.
The possibility of failing to score has been provided for in a
pin game. On the other hand, it is not one of the
hazards of the game that the balls should fail to come up if I have
put a penny in the slot. It is possible that, say in an
accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my
side, and think it is mine, when really it is my
neighbour's. And I could, looking into a mirror,
mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the
other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say
I have toothache. To ask “are you sure that
it's you who have pains?” would
be nonsensical. Now, when in this case no error is
possible, it is because the move which we might be inclined to
think of as an error, a “bad move”, is no move of
the game at all. (We distinguish in chess between
good and bad moves, and we call it a mistake if we expose the
113. queen to a
bishop. But it is no mistake to promote a pawn to a
king.) And now this way of stating our idea suggests
itself: that it is as impossible that in making the statement
“I have toothache” I should have
mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by
mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To
say, “I have pain” is no more a
statement about a particular person than moaning
is. “But surely the word ‘I’
in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it; it points to
himself; and very often a man who says it actually points to
himself with his finger”. But it was quite
superfluous to point to himself. He might just as well
only have raised his hand. It would be wrong to say that
when someone points to the sun with his hand, he is pointing
both to the sun and himself because it is he who points;
on the other hand, he may by pointing attract attention both to the
sun and to himself. |
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