There are many uses of the word
“personali
ty” which we may feel
inclined to adopt, all more or less akin. The same
applies when we define the identity of a person by means of his
memories. Imagine a man whose memories on the even days
of his life comprise the events of all these days, skipping
entirely what happened on the odd days. On the other
hand, he remembers on an odd day what happened on previous odd
days, but his memory would then skip the even days without a
feeling of discontinuity. If we like we can also assume
that he has alternating appearances and characteristics on odd
and even days. Are we bound to say that here two persons
are inhabiting the same body? That is, is it right to
say that there are, and wrong to say that there
aren't, or vice versa?
Neither. For the
ordinary use of the word
“person” is what one might call a composite use
suitable under the ordinary circumstances. If I assume,
as I do, that these circumstances are changed, the application of
the term “person” or
“personality” has thereby changed, and if I wish to
preserve this term and give it a use analogous to its former use, I
am at liberty to choose between many uses, that is, between many
different kinds of analogy. One might say in such a case
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that the term
“personality” hasn't got one legitimate
heir only. (This kind of consideration is
of importan
ce in the philosophy of
mathematics. Consider the use of the words
“proof”, “formula”, and
others. Consider the question: “Why
should what we do here be called
‘philosophy’? Why should it be
regarded as the only legitimate heir of the different activities
which had this name in former times?”)