Now
when the solipsist says that only his own experiences are real, it
is no use answering him: “Why do you tell us
this if you don't believe that we really hear
it?” Or anyhow, if we give him this answer,
we mustn't believe that we have answered his
difficulty. There is no common sense answer to a
philosophical problem. One can only defend common sense
against the attacks of philosophers by solving their puzzles,
i.e., by curing them of the temptation to attack
common sense; not by restating the views of common sense.
A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who
doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is
his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist
disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street.
That is, his disagreement is not founded on a more subtle
knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for
the
source of his puzzlement. And we find that
there is puzzlement and mental discomfort, not only when our
curiosity about certain facts is not satisfied or when we
can't find a law of nature fitting in with all our
experience, but also when a notation dissatisfies us, ‒ ‒ ‒
perhaps because of various associations which it calls up.
Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the
one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one
position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels
cramped having a desire for other positions as well.
Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a
difference
99.
more strongly, makes it
more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a
particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than
our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when
we are shown the notations which fulfill these needs.
These needs can be of the greatest variety.