On the one hand it is clear that every proposition of our language “is in order just as it is”. That is, that we don't
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aren't trying to reach
don't strive after
an ideal. As though our ordinary, vague propositions didn't ˇyet have any meaning yet and we had
still
yet
to show what a correct proposition looks like. On the other hand it seems clear that where there is meaning there must be perfect order.
Therefore
So that the
perfect order must be even in the vaguest proposition.
      “The meaning of
a
the
proposition – we
are inclined
should like
to say – can certainly leave this or that open, but the proposition must surely have one definite meaning.” Or: “An [|]indefinite meaning’, that would really be no meaning.” Th[at|is] is like saying, : “A boundary
which
that
is_ n[o|']t sharp, that is really no boundary at all”. Thech line of thought here is
something like
roughly
this: [I|i]f I say, “I've locked
him
the man
up in
securely
well
in the room – only one door
was left
remained
open”, then in fact I haven't locked him
up
inch
at all; he only gives the there was only an a illusion pretence of ˇhis being locked
up
inch
.
We should
One would
ˇhere in such a case be inclined to say here, : “so you didn't do anything nothing's has been done at all”. And yet he did do somethingˇ was had been done. (A boundary
which
that
has a
hole
gap
we'ld
one would
likech to say – is as good as none at all. But is th[at|is] really true?)
      Consider also this proposition: “The ru[el|le]s of a game can certainly
allow
leave
a certain freedom, but they must
nevertheless
still
be quite definite rules.” That's is as though you
said
were to say
, : “By means of four walls you cann indeed leave a person a certain freedom of movement, but the walls must be perfectly ridgid” – and th[at|is] is_ n[o|']t true. If, however ˇon the other hand, you say, : “the walls may,
of course
no doubt
, be elastic, but then they have
one
a quite
definite elasticity” – what does th[at|is] say further? ? It seems to say that you
must
would have to
be able to state this elasticity; but th[at|is] again is not true. “The thing always has one definite length – whether I know
the length
it
or not”: th[at|is] is really by this we really
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really the avowal of ˇa declar[a|e]ation that we attach ourselves to a particular expression. That namely Th[at|e] form of expression which makes uses of makes use of the form of an ideal of exactness. [S|s]o to speak as a parameter of the description.