Ramsey once insisted, in a discussion with me, ˇstressed the point that logic is a [“| ‘]normative science[”| ’]. ˇI can't say, [E|e]xactly, what idea he had in mind, I don't kn[w|o]w; but it was undoubtedly closely

related to that
connected with one

which dawned on me I only laterˇ got hold of: – namely that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, ˇor with calculi

having
, according to

fixed rules, but ˇthat we can[no|']t say that whoeverch uses language must play such a game. – But if ˇIf, however, you say that our expression of languages only approximates to such a calculi, then you stand

right at
immediately on

the edge of a misunderstanding. For this ˇthus it may make it seem as though in [L|l]ogic we spoke about an ideal/language. As though our logic were ˇwas, so to speak, a logic, as it were, for empty space a vacuum ˇnot taking into account friction & air-resistance. Whereas actually logic does_ n[o|']t treat of language – (or ˇof thought) – in the sense on in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and

all
the miost

one can ˇmight say would be ˇis that we construct ideal languages. But here ˇto use the word “ideal”

“ideal” ˇhere would be misleading; since it would then ◇pe◇ seem

that
as though

it suggests for this would make it appear as though thes_ e languages

are
werech

better, more perfect, than our everyday language; ˇand as though a logician were needed to show

us,
people

after all
at last

what a correct

sentence
proposition

[,|l]ooks like.
But that ˇall this can only appear in the correct light when we have

reached greater
gained

clarity concerning the ideas of understanding,

meaning
supposing

and thinking. For then it will also become get clear what may mislead one– , and did has mislead me (Tract.atus Log.ico-Phil.sophicus), – into thinking that whoever utters a sentence and means, or understands, it is thereby working doing ˇis using a claculus according to definite rules.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.