| | | | | | Consider this example: If someone
says, :
“Moses exist”, then
that can mean this can have different sorts of
things meanings.
It may mean: the
[i|I]srealites
did_
n[o|']t have one leader when they
Egypt – or: their leader was not called
Moses –
or; : there
ˇnever was nbody nobody that
anyone who did all the
Bible records of
Moses – etc.,
etc.. –
According to In
Russell's
ˇterminology we may say: the name
“Moses” can be defined by
various descriptions.
, as
“the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the
daughter of Pharoah
Pharao”,
etc..
And according as we take the one or the other definition the
“Moses existed” gets a
different , and
similarly with every
which treats of
Moses. –
And if someone
us, :
“N did_
n[o|']t exist”, do we
askˇ questions
like, :
“What do you mean? Do you wish to say that
… , or that … , etc.
etc.?”
But if I make a statement about Moses, am I
always prepared to substitute any one of these descriptions for
“Moses”?
I shall say, perhaps,:
that – by
“Moses” I
the man who did
what the 56 the
Bible records of
Moses, or at any rate of it.
But how much?
Have I come to any deci[sion|ded]
as to how much ˇof it must to be false in order that I
should my
as
falsech?
So Has ˇis my use of the name
“Moses” for me them a
fixed and clearly unambiguously determined use in
for all possible cases? –
Isn't it like this, that I have, , a whole
of props in
readiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another
shou[d|l]d be withdrawn ˇtaken from
under me, and vice versa?
–
Consider still yet another
case: If I say, “N has died”,
then the position with as
regards to the meaning of the name
“N” may be this: I believe that a
person lived whom I (1) in such and such a
place[,|s,] who (2) looked like this and
this (pictures), (3) did such and such ˇthings,
and (4) in the social world had the name
bears this
name |
“N”.
ˇIf
[A|a]sked what I
by
“N” I should enumerate all
th[at|is] these things, or
some of itˇ them, and different things
ones on different occasions.
My definition of “N” would
ˇthus be, then say: “the man of whom all
th[at|is]
is true”. –
But suppose something in
of it
should turns
turned out to be
false, – –
should shall will I be
prepared to declare the
“N has died” false, – even
if ˇonly ˇthough something
which that ˇthat to me
seeme[d|s] to
me quite
inessential
incidental |
turn[e|s]d had
turned out to be false?
But where is the limit of what's
is
? –
If I had Had I, in such a case, given an
explanation of the name in such a case, then I
now be prepared to
it.
And we may express this by saying:
ˇcan be expressed thus: I use the name
“N” without a
ˇrigid
meaning.
(But
th[at|is]
no more impairs its use tha[t|n] it impairs
impairs the use of a table that it
stand[s|ing] on four legs instead of
on three and so on occasion ˇthough
occasionally such a table
wobbles.)
Ought to say that I use a
word whose the meaning ˇof
which
I don't know and so talk
nonsense ˇthus what I say has no sense? –
Say what you like, so long as this
doesn't
not
prevent you from see[k|i]ng what the situation is.
(And if you
57 you see
th[at|is],
then there are things you won't
say.) | | |