Consider this example: If someone
says, || :
“Moses did
not || didn't exist”, then that can mean different
sorts of things || this can have different meanings.
It may mean: the
Israelites
did
not || didn't have one leader when they
journeyed out of || left
Egypt – or: their leader was not called
Moses –
or; || : there
was nobody that || never was anyone
who did all the things
that || that the
Bible records of
Moses – etc.,
etc.. –
According to
Russell || In
Russell's
terminology we may say: the name
“Moses” can be defined by
various descriptions.
For
instance || E.g., as
“the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the
daughter of
Pharao”,
etc..
And according as we take the one or the other definition the
proposition || sentence
“Moses existed” gets a
different meaning || sense, and
similarly with every
proposition || sentence which treats of
Moses. –
And if someone says to || tells
us, || :
“N did
not || didn't exist”, do we
also || really ask questions
like, || :
“What do you mean? Do you wish to say that
… , or that … , etc.
etc.?” But if I make a statement about Moses, am I always prepared to substitute any one of these descriptions for “Moses”? I shall say, perhaps, that || : || – by “Moses” I understand || mean the man who did what the 56 ¤
Bible records of
Moses, or at any rate a
lot || much of it.
But how much?
Have I come to any decision as
to || decided how much of it must be
shown || turn out to be false in order that I
should abandon || give up my
proposition || statement as
false?
Has the name
“Moses” for
me || them a fixed and clearly || unambiguously
determined use in || So is my use of the name
“Moses” fixed and
determined for all possible cases? –
Isn't it like this, that I have, so to
speak || as it were, a whole
row || lot of props in
readiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another
should be withdrawn || taken from
under me, and vice versa?
–
Consider still || yet another
case: If I say, “N has died”,
then the position with regards
to || as regards the meaning of the name
“N” may be this: I believe that a
person lived whom I
(1) || (1) I have
seen || saw in such and such a
place, || places, who (2) looked like this and
this (pictures), (3) did such and such things,
and (4) in the social world bears this
name || had the name
“N”.
Asked || If
asked what I
understand || mean by
“N” I should enumerate all
that || this or some of it,
and different things || these things, or some of them, and different
ones on different occasions.
My definition of “N” would
be
then || thus be, say: “the man of whom all
that || this
is true”. –
But suppose something in || some of it
should
turn || turns || turned out to be
false, – || –
should || shall || will I be
prepared to declare the
proposition || sentence
“N has died” false, – even
if only || though something
which || that seemed to me || that
to me seems incidental || quite
inessential
turned || turns || had
turned out to be false?
But where is the limit of what is || what's
incidental || inessential? –
If I
had given an explanation of the name in such a case || Had I, in
such a case, given an explanation of the name, then I
should || would now be prepared to
change || alter
it. And we may express this by saying: || this can be expressed thus: I use the name “N” without a settled || firm || rigid meaning. (But that || this no more impairs its use than it impairs the use of a table that it stands on four legs instead of on three and so on occasion || standing on four legs instead of three impairs the use of a table though occasionally such a table wobbles.) Ought one || we to say that I use a word whose meaning || the meaning of which I don't know and so talk nonsense || thus what I say has no sense? – Say what you like, so long as this doesn't || does not prevent you from seeing what the situation is. (And if you 57 ¤ see
that || this,
then there are a good
many || some things you won't
say.) |
To cite this element you can use the following URL:
BOXVIEW: http://wittgensteinsource.com/BTE/Ts-226,55[2]et55[3]et56[1]et56[2]_n
RDF: http://wittgensteinsource.com/BTE/Ts-226,55[2]et55[3]et56[1]et56[2]_n/rdf
JSON: http://wittgensteinsource.com/BTE/Ts-226,55[2]et55[3]et56[1]et56[2]_n/json