If someone explains to me the names of the colours by pointing to samples and saying, : “This colour is called ‘blue’, th[ei|is] ‘green’,” etc.”, then this case

can be compared
is comparable

, in many repsects,

to the case where
with that in which

he gives me a table in which the words

stand
e

under the samples of colours, – although this comparison may be misleading us in various ways. – One is Now we are inclined now to extend th[e|is] comparison: [T|t]o have understood the explanation means to have in mind possess a concept,ˇ, in your mind,, of what ˇthat which has been explainedˇ in your mind, and that is[:|(]ˇto possess a sample or a picture image[.|)] – ˇso [I|i]f someone shows me various leaves and says, : “Th[at|is] is what's we called a ‘leaf’[”| ”], then I get ˇobtain a concept of ‘the

‘shape
form

of a leaf’, an image picture of it, in my mind. – But what does

a picture
the image

of a leaf look like which has no ˇdoesn't have any particular shap[w|e] ˇof leaf but rather [“| ‘]that which is ˇin common to all shapes of leaves[”| ’]? What ˇis the colour has the ˇof my mental sample in my mind of the colour green, – i.e., of that which is common to all shades of green?
“But

coudn't
mightn't

there be such a ‘universal’ sample[?|s?] Say a diagram of a leaf, or a sample of pure green.” – Certain[,|l]y. – But the fact that this diagram is understood as a diagram and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and that

a
the

coloured square of pure green is understood as a sample of everything that is greenish and not as a sample

of
for

pure green: that lies again in the way in which these samples are used. applied.

used.

⋎

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.