But what if no such sample

is used in
belongs to

the language, if for

for instance e.g., we remember the colour which a word stands for? “And if we remember it,

that means
then

it comes before our mind's eye when we utter the word. The colour ˇin itself must therefore be indestructible, if it is to be possible for us at any time to remember it.”
But what do we take then as the criterion that we for remembering it correctly? – If we work with a sample instead of with our memory, then we say, on occasion ˇ

sometimes
under certain circumstances

, that the sample has changed its colour, and we judge this by ˇour memory. But may[we|n't] not we,

under
in

certain circumstances, speak also of a darkening

(e.g.)
– for instance –

of our memory image? Aren't we just as much at the mercy of memory as we are of a sample? (For someone might

wish
want

to say, : “If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample.”) Or, say, of a chemical reaction: –

imagine
Supposech

you had to paint a particular colour, its name is “

F
S

”, and it is the colour which you see when you combine the substance S ˇcombines with the substance T under such and such conditions. – Suppose the co[,|l]our appeared to you one day brighter than on another, [sh|w]ouldn't you then, under certain circumstances, say, “I must be mistaken, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday”[,|?] This shows that we do not always

regard
treat

what memory says as the

verdict of the highest court,
highest verdict,

beyond which there is no appeal.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.