In the description of the language game in № (57) I said that the words “r”, “g” etc., corresponded || correspond to the colours of the squares. But what does this correspondence consist in; || what's this correspondence; ¤ how far || in what sense can one say that certain colours of the squares correspond to these signs? The || For the explanation in (57) only made a connection between these signs and certain words in our ordinary language (the names of colours). – Well, it was assumed that the use of the signs was taught otherwise || differently in the actual game, namely || – by pointing to paradigms. Quite, || ; – but what does it mean to say that in the practice of the language certain elements correspond to the signs? – Does it consist in the fact || this, that whoever is || the person describing the complex of coloured squares always says “r” where there is a red

¤ square, “b” where there is a black square, etc.? But what if he makes a mistake in his description and wrongly says “r” where there is a black square; what is || what's then the criterion that shows that this was a || here for this being a mistake? – Or does “r”'s indicating || standing for a red square consist in the fact, || “‘r’ stands for” a red square || a red square” mean that the people who use the language always have a red square before their minds when they use the sign “r”?
     In order to || To see more clearly we have here, as in innumerable || a great number of similar cases, to || should here, as in a great number of similar cases, keep the details || detail of the processes || what really happens in detail before our eyes || look at what really happens in detail, to observe from close at hand what happens. || ; as it were, from close by.
     If I am inclined to assume || take the view that a mouse comes into existence || is produced || springs, by spontaneous generation, out of || from grey scraps || rags and dust, then it will be well to examine these scraps || rags carefully to see how a mouse could conceal || have concealed itself in them, how it could come || have got there etc.. If, however, I am convinced that a mouse cannot || can't just come into being out of || be generated from these things, then this examination may be superfluous.
     What it is, however, that hinders in philosophy such an examination of the details, is something we have yet to come to understand. || But we have yet got to see what it is that, in doing philosophy, makes it so difficult to scrutinize these details. || But we have yet got to see what it is that sets itself against our scrutinizing these details, when we are doing philosophy.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.