But what gives people the idea of wanting to make just this word || why should one wish to regard just this word as a name, when it so obviously isn't a name? – Just that || For this very reason; for they || we are inclined to make an objection || object || raise an objection to what is generally called “name” || calling “a name” what is generally called so; and the || this objection can be put in this way || expressed by saying: that the name really ought to indicate || stand for something simple. And for this one might give the following reasons || this can be defended as follows:– A proper name in the ordinary sense would be || is, for instance || e.g., the word “Nothung || Excalibur”. The sword Nothung consists || consisted of various parts put together in a particular || certain way. If they are put together differently || in a different way || not put together in this way then Nothung doesn't exist. Now the sentence “Nothung has a sharp edge” obviously has meaning || sense, whether Nothung is still whole or has been smashed to bits. Yet if “Nothung” is the name of an object, then this object doesn't exist any more when Nothung has been smashed; and since the name wouldn't have any object corresponding to it then, it wouldn't have || then has no object corresponding to it, it hasn't any meaning. But then in the sentence, “Nothung has a sharp edge”, there would be || is a word that has no || without a meaning, and so || therefore the sentence || “Nothung has a sharp edge” would be
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¤ nonsense. But the sentence || to say this does have meaning, and so the words of which it consists must always correspond to something || to the words of which it consists something must always correspond. So that || Therefore in the || an analysis of the meaning || sense ◇◇◇ the word “Nothung” must disappear, and in its place || instead of it must come words || words must appear that name || which stand for || denote something simple || simple objects. And these || These words we may reasonably call the real names.