In t[e|h]e languages ([3|4]) and ([9|11]) there was no such thing as asking what someathing is called. This and its correlate, the ostensive explanation, definition, is, we might say, a separate language game. That means really: we are

taught
brought up

, trained, to asked “What is th[at|is] called?”, – and then the nam[i|e]ng follows is given. ˇAnd [T|t]here is also a language gameof : inventing a name for something.

I.e., to say
That is, of saying

, “Th[at's|is is] called …” and then

to use
using

the new name. (In this way,

e.g.
for instance

, children name their dolls and [g|t]hen go on to talk about them. In this connection consider at the same time how what a ˇvery special use ˇwe make of a personal name: it is when we use it to call someone.) // … how speci[l|a]l that use of a personal name is with which we call the person named.) //
Now you we can give an ostensiv[e|ly] defin[i|e]nition a personal name, a colour word, [a| the] name of a material, a numeral, the name of a direction // the name [f|o]f a point of the compass // , etc., etc.. The defin[t|i]tion of two: “Th[at|is] is called ‘two’” – pointin[t|g] to two nuts – is perfectly exact. – But how can you define “two” in th[at|is] way? The person to whom you are giv[i|e]ng the definition

won't
doesn't

know then what ˇit is you w[ant|ish] to call “two”; he'll suppose that you are have call[in|ed]g this group of nuts “two”. – He may suppose this, – but perhaps he won't suppose it. . He might also do just the opposite: when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts he might take this

to be
for

the name

name of a number. And equally, if I give an ostensive definition of a personal name, he might take

it
this

to be the name of a colour, the name of a race, even the name of a direction ˇpoint of the compass. That is, the ostensive de[r|f]inition can in every cases be interpreted in one this way or and also in others. in that way.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.