In
t
he languages (
4) and
(
11) there was no such thing as asking
what
something || a
thing is called. This and its correlate, the
ostensive explanation, definition, is, we might say, a separate
language game. That means really: we are
brought up || taught, trained,
to ask “What is
that || this
called?”, – and then the
naming follows || name is
given.
There || And
there is also a language game
of || : inventing a name for
something.
That is, of
saying || I.e., to
say, “
That's || This
is called …” and then
using || to use the new
name. (In this way,
for
instance || e.g.,
children name their dolls and
then go on to talk
about them. In this connection consider
at
the same time a very special use || what a very
special use we make of a personal name: it is
when we use it to call someone.) || … how special that
use of a personal name is with which we call the person
named.) Now
you can give an
ostensive definition of || we can ostensively define a
personal name, a colour word,
a || the name of a
material, a numeral,
the name of a direction
|| the name of a point of the
compass, etc.,
etc.. The defin
ition of
two:
“
That || This
is called ‘two’” –
pointin
g to two nuts – is perfectly exact. – But how can you define
“two
” in
that || this
way? The person to whom you
are
giving || give the definition
doesn't || won't
know then || then
know what it is you
want || wish
to call “two”; he'll suppose that you
are
calling || have called this group of nuts
“two”. – He
may suppose
this,
– but perhaps he won't
suppose it. || . He
might also do just the opposite: when I want to assign a name
to this group of nuts he might take this
for || to be the name
19
¤ of a
number. And equally, if I give an ostensive definition
of a personal name, he might take
this || it to be the name of a
colour, the name of a race, even the name of a
direction || point of the
compass. That is, the ostensive
de
finition can in
every case || all
cases be interpreted in
one way and also in others. || this way or in that way.