But the form of a proposition symbolizes in the following way:
Let us consider symbols of the form
“x R
y”; to these correspond primarily pairs of objects, of
which one has the name “x”, the other the name
“y”.
The x's and y's stand in various relations to each
other, among others the relation R holds between some, but not
between others.
I now determine the sense of
“x R
y” by laying down: when the facts behave in
regard to “x R y” so that the meaning of
“x” stands in the relation R to the meaning
of “y”, then I say that they [the facts]
are “of like sense”
[“gleichsinnig”] with the proposition
“x R
y”; otherwise, “of opposite sense”
[
“entgegengesetzt”];
I correlate the facts to the symbol
“x R
y”
by thus dividing them into those of like
sense and those of opposite sense.
To this correlation corresponds the correlation of name and
meaning.
Both are psychological.
Thus I understand the form “x R y” when I know that it
discriminates the behaviour of x and y according as these
stand in the relation R or not.
In this way I extract from all possible relations the relation R,
as, by a name, I extract its meaning from among all possible
things.
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