But the form of a proposition symbolizes in the following way: Let us consider symbols of the form “x R y”; to these correspond primarily pairs of objects, of which one has the name “x”, the other the name “y”. The x's and y's stand in various relations to each other, among others the relation R holds between some, but not between others. I now determine the sense of “x R y” by laying down: when the facts behave in regard to “x R y” so that the meaning of “x” stands in the relation R to the meaning of “y”, then I say that they [the facts] are “of like sense” [“gleichsinnig”] with the proposition “x R y”; otherwise, “of opposite sense” [“entgegengesetzt”]; I correlate the facts to the symbol “x R y” by thus dividing them into those of like sense and those of opposite sense. To this correlation corresponds the correlation of name and meaning. Both are psychological. Thus I understand the form “x R y” when I know that it discriminates the behaviour of x and y according as these stand in the relation R or not. In this way I extract from all possible relations the relation R, as, by a name, I extract its meaning from among all possible things.