There is no thing which is the form of a proposition, & no name which is the name of a form. Accordingly we can also not say that a relation which in certain cases holds between things holds sometimes between forms & things. This goes against Russell's theory of judgment.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.



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