  The Bedeutung of a prop. is the fact that corresponds to it, e.g. aRb, if our prop. be aRb, if it's true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if false, the fact ~aRb. But both “the fact aRb” & “the fact ~aRb” are incomplete symbols, which must be analysed.
  That a prop. has a relation (in wide sense) to Reality, other than that of Bedeutung, is shewn by the fact that you can understand it when you don't know the Bedeutung, i.e. don't know whether it's true or false. Let us express this by saying “It has sense” (Sinn).
  In analysing Bedeutung, you come upon Sinn, as follows:–
We want, to explain the relation of props. to reality.
  The relation is as follows: It's simples have meaning = are names of simples; & it's relations have a quite different relation to relations; such that, if all the fact that these things are true & these 2 facts already establishes a sort of correspondence between a prop. wh. contains th[em|ese] & reality. & only these & reality: i.e. if all the simples of a prop. are known, we already k already know that Reality “behaves” in a certain way towards these. we can describe reality by saying that it behaves in a certain way to the whole proposition. All that remains to be done is to state in what way reality must behave to the prop., if the prop. is to be called ‘true’.         [This amounts to saying that we can compare reality

with the prop.. In the case of 2 lines we can compare them in respect of their length without any convention & the comparison is automatic. But in our case the possibility of comparison depends upon the conventions by which we have given meanings to our simples (names & relations).]
It only remains to fix the method of comparison, by saying what

about
that is true of

our simples is to mean say what about reality. E.g. suppose we take 2 lines of unequal length; & say that the fact that the shorter is of the length it is is to mean that that the longer is of the length it is: we should then have established a convention ˇas to the meaning of the shorter of the sort we are now to give it
From this it results that ‘true’ & ‘false’ are not accidental properties of a prop., such that, when it has meaning, we can say it is also true or false: on the contrary to have meaning means to be true or false; i.e. that reality is true or false to it. bei the being true or false actually constitutes the relation of the prop. to reality, wh. we mean by saying that it has meaning. (Sinn)

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.