Moore good “Moore” ◇◇◇
     Logical so-called propositions shew logical properties of language & therefore of the Universe, but say nothing.
     This is shewn by fact || means that by merely looking at them you can see these properties; whereas, in a proposition proper, you cannot see what it says || is true by looking at it.
     It is impossible to say what these properties are, because in order to do so, you would need a language, which hadn't got the properties . in question, & it is impossible that this should be a proper language. Impossible to construct an illogical language.
     In order that you should have a language which can express or say everything that can be said, this language must have certain properties; & when this is the case, that it has them can no longer be said in that language or any language.
     An illogical language would be one in which e.g. you could put an event into a hole.
     Thus a language which can express everything mirrors certain properties of the world by those properties which it must have; & logical so-called propositions shew in a systematic way those properties.
     How, usually, logical propositions do shew these properties is this. We give a certain description of a kind of symbol; we find that other symbols, combined in certain ways, || yield a symbol of this description; & that they do shews something about these symbols.
     As a rule the description given in ordinary Logic is the description of a tautology; but others might shew equally well, e.g.: a contradiction.


     Every real proposition shews something, besides what it says, about the Universe: for, if it has no sense, it can't be used; &, if it has a sense, it mirrors some logical property of the Universe.
     E.g. take φa, φa ⊃ ψa, ψa. By merely looking at these 3, I can see that 3 follows from 1 & 2: i.e. I can see what's called the truth of a logical proposition, namely of the proposition (φa . φa ⊃ ψa : ⊃ : ψa). But this is not a proposition; but by seeing that it is a tautology I can see what I already saw by looking at the 3 propositions: the difference is that I now see that it is a tautology.
     We want to say, in order to understand the above, what properties a symbol must have, in order to be a tautology:–
Many ways of saying this are possible:
(1) One way is to give certain symbols; then to give a set of rules for combining them; & then to say any symbol formed from those symbols, by combining them according to one of the given rules, is a tautology. This obviously says something about the kind of symbol you can get in this way.
     This is the actual procedure of old Logic: It gives so-called primitive propositions; so-called rules of deduction; & then says that what you got by applying the rules to the propositions is a logical proposition that you have proved. The truth is it tells you something about the kind of proposition you have got, viz. that it can be derived from the first symbols by these rules of combination = [?] is a tautology.
     :. if we say one logical proposition follows logically from another, this means something quite different from saying that a real proposition follows logically from another. For a so-called proof of a logical proposition does not prove its truth (logical propositions are neither true nor false) but proves that it is a logical proposition = is a tautology.
     Logical propositions are forms of proofs: they shew that one or more propositions follow from one (or more).