Now why do we say: My [pri|fee]lings are my private property. Because only I am directly aware of my pain. But what does that mean. I suppose to be aware of pain means to feel it, & isn't it ‘my’ pain because I feel it. So what does it mean to say only I feel my pain. We have, so far, not given any sense to the phrase I feel his pain (except in the sense I feel

the same kind of pain or perhaps I vividly imagine his pain) & therefore no use to the phrase I feel my pain either. (I don't say that we couldn't arrange for a sense for these phrases.) We could of course use the prop. ‘A person is directly aware of his pain only & indirectly aware of the other mans’ as a grammatical rule Bestimmung to the effect that if I say of N “N. directly

aware of pain” this

is to mean
means

, ‘N has pain’ whereas ‘N is indir. aware of pain’ is to mean: N is aware of the fact that someone else has pain’. (And this I'm inclined to call the healthy use of these phrases)

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.