∕∕

Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the expression “I have lied” the child must behave in the normal way. E.g. it must under certain circs. ‘admit’ that it lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc. etc. etc.. We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found out the word would have a different meaning. “But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or not!” – Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies are ◇◇◇ judged by the ordinary criteria, ◇◇◇ truths. He sais that he has been to school feeling that it's a ly but the teacher ˇ& the boys confirms that he has been etc. etc.. You might say: “But surely he can't be in doubt that he said a subjective ly”. But suppose he said “I've been to school”

This ˇof course is like saying that he can't be in doubt ˇabout whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience E is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the assymetry of the game № 1. On the other hand

one can't say that “surely I must know what ˇit is I see” for unless to know what I see is to mean to see whatever I see. ◇◇◇ The question is what are we to call “knowing what ˇit is I see”, “not being in doubt about what it is I see”. Under what circumstances are we to say that a person is in no doubt ˇor in doubt about this? (Such cases as being in no doubt about whether this looks red to the normal eye & analogous ones ˇof course don't interest us here.) I suppose that to the knowledge of what it is I see must be the knowledge that it is so & so I see. ‘So & so’ standing for some expression verbal or otherwise. (But remember that I don't give myself an information by pointing to something I see with my finger & saying to myself I see this.) ‘So & so’ in fact stands for

a word
an expression

of a lang. game. And doubting what it is I see

is
will be

doubting what lang. game to play ˇe.g. what to call what I see. But there may be very different cases of this. I may just ‘have forgotten the name of the colour’. This means

that I can find it out by asking someone what is this colour (pointing) called. But this isn't an interesting case.
Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the appelation of a colour & ˇit can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts doubts about what people removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.