You say: A grown-up “Surely I can moan with toothache & I can moan without toothache, so why shouldn't the child be able it be so with the child? Of course I only see

& hear the childs behaviour but from my own experience I know whatc toothache is (like) // I know toothache apart from behaviour // & I am led to believe that the others ˇsometimes have the pains I have”. – The first sentence allready is misleading: It isn't the question wheter I can moan with & without toothache, but the point is that I distinguish ‘moaning with toothache’ & ‘moaning without toothache’ & now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't. We teach the child t[he|o] use the words “I have toothache” to replace its moans, & this was how I

too
myself

was taught the expression. ˇHow do I know that I have learnt the word t. to mean what they wanted me to express? ˇI ought to say I believe I have t.?
Now one can moan because one has pains or, or e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act & in this case I teach it to mean by ‘toothache’ something I don't

intend
want

it to mean?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.