It is said sometimes that if I & someone else are looking at some object I can never know what colour the other really sees. But with what
right do we here speak of || use ‘colour’ & seeing? Some philosophers like (e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined to think that they can solve the puzzle || save the situation by using the senseless phrase “We can't know what the other has”. Compare Driesch:
… .
     But the word ‘to have’ could here only help us if it had no meaning at all & then it couldn't help us. But as long as ‘to have’ here has any meaning at all it can't help us & when it has no meaning at all I think it can't help us either.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.



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