“You talk as though one
can't
couldn't
see a red patch without if one
can't
doesn't
say
that one does; as As if seeing something was saying that one sees it”.
 “Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than it might appear to you.
    We say a blind man does not see anything. But not only do we say so but he too sais that he does not see. I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whome do we call blind, what is our criterium for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if
the
a
person behaves in that particular way we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't just a behaviour; it's clear that an man can behave like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different: in fact something this behaviour only helps him
to understand what we mean by ‘blindness’. The outward circumstances are what both we & ⇄ he know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way we say ˇthat he sees nothing & he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases &
so concludes
thereby knows
that we mean this experience of his by saying that he sees nothing”.
    The idea is that we teach a
person
man
the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectely. – Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. № ) We I teach a child the names of colours & a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour if when the ‘name of the colour’ is called out. I We don't however teach him the colournames by pointing to a sample which we both see // which both of us see // which I & he see saying ˇe.g. the word ‘red’. but Instead we let him look at a white wall sheet of paper through
a pair of
various
spectacles which if we look through them make us see the paper red & we say the word ‘red’ whenever we put these spectacles on his nose.
I have various spectacles each of which when
I
we
look through it makes
me
us
see the ˇwhite paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their
outside apearance the red one ˇthat makes me see red has
circular
round
glasses
another
the green
one eliptical ones [I|We] now teach the child in this way that when I see it looking through the putting the
circular
round
ones on his nose I say the word ‘red’, etc. when the eliptical ones ‘green’ & so forth. This one might call teaching the child the ˇmeanings of the colournames in an indirect way because I one could
in this case
here
say that I led the child to correlate the word red with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if it looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indire[k|c]t as opposed to the dire[k|c]t way of pointing to a red object etc..