But couldn't we imagine some kind of perversity in a child which made it say red when it saw green & vice versa & at the

same time this not being discovered because it happened to see red in those cases when we say green? But if here we talk of perversity we could || might also assume that we all were perverse. For how are we or B ever to find out that he is perverse?
     The idea is, that he ¤ finds out (& we do) when later on he learns how the word ‘perverse’ is used & now || then he remembers that he was that way all along.
     Imagine this case: The child looks at the lights: says the name of the right colour to himself in an aside & then loud the wrong word. It chuckles while doing so. This is, one may say, a rudimentary form of cheating. One might even say: “This child is going to be a liar”. But if it had not said the aside but only imagined itself pointing to one colour on the chart & then said the wrong word, – was this cheating too?
     Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.