Privacy of sense data.
I see dark red where he sees light red.
  We interpose an object between the phys obj. and the seeing subject.
  As we only know about his seeing this sense data by what he shows, we are inclined to say that we don't see his sense datum. Or that we don't know whether we see it.
  Why shouldn't he allways see green when I see red? It would seem that we must admit this possibility. Compare: “Of course we never know whet. new circs wouldn't show that after all he saw what we see.”
  “Can't I imagine all blind people to see.” Cant I imagine Mr W. now seeing & now blind but always behaving as he does? For this seems to be the source for saying that it must make sense. What do we imagine & how does the image give sense to the sentence.
  “Surely what I have he can have”.
↻ “Remember that we admit that the other can have pain without expressing it. So if this is conceivable why not that everybody has constant pain?
  It seems that we must be able to imagine this & that therefore the prop makes sense independent of any expression of pain.
  “As I ˇmyself can see so I can imagine him to do what I do. I can imagine him to play the same role in the act of seeing which I play. How are we to make the substitution.
  “Can't he all along mean something different by ‘[G|g]reen’ that I do? Surely I can imagine that! Surely I know what it is like to have the impression green!” I have at least a private explanation of the word, though this may not be transmittable to anyone else! But is this private explanation an explanation at all? Is it a justification?
  “The sense datum is private
is a rule forbidding e.g. “They had the same different sensedatuma”. It may or may not allow “he guessed that the other had the sense datum so & so.” It may only allow “The other looked at the chair had a sense datum & said . Use?
  “Surely I distinguish between having pain & showing it & showing it without ….
  This can't be merely a matter of using different expressions!?”
  Do we allways distinguish between ‘mere behaviour’ & ‘real experience’?
  You could of course always express yourself in the form of the supposition that the other is no automaton.
  “saying that I ly is justified by a particular experience.”
  Is toothache a behaviour? Is moaning the same as to say “I moan”.

  Our point is only that we can't explain a word by a private experience which can't be shown.
  Moaning isn't a description. Do I talk about L.W. if I say that I have toothache

  “If a body constantly changed its weight, it would make nonsense to talk about ‘its weight’”, “If the chair behaved in this manner, we wouldn't talk about ‘a chair’”.
  “If the natural colour only lasted for half an hour, it would loose its point to talk about the ‘natural colour’ of an object.”
  Certain expressions have their sense in a certain behaviour being the rule & not the exception.
  The imporance of these remarks: that it often seems as though grammar said something about objects, whereas it treats of samples. But isn't it in the nature of the world that there is such an object as blue? Isn't it in the nature … that there is a foot, a unit, etc.?

  Grammar & the nature of objects.
  What do we call the nature of an obj.?
  “What is the nature of this→?”
  Determining objcts by pointing in various ways
  Having in comon.
  The object which I mean
“What is the nature of space?” of what? “ ״ ״ ״ ״ ״ colour?”
“What I mean must have this grammar”
The name of the obj which
I am talking about must have …”.
Pointing to colour, to the phys. body.
Sense data, origin of the idea. Philos. since Decartes. Concentrating ones attention. Looking & seeing
“Only sense data are real”
Is a cube symmetrical or not?
“I can't know what he feels” “Only he can know ״ ״ ״ ”
“Only you can know what you feel!”
  Privacy of sense data
Private language          G