Notes for the ‘Philosophical
Lecture’. Privacy
of experiences. This privacy a
super privacy.
Something like privacy. What seems to be the
essential characteristic of
privacy? Nobody but I can see
it, feel it, hear it; nobody except myself knows what it's
like. Nobody except I can get at it. Language
game with the colour
chart. Let us imagine each man has a private
chart (perhaps besides
having a public one). Imagine he
points to green on his private chart when ‘red’ is said
why should we say he means by ‘red’ the
colour we mean by ‘green’? |
Meaning consisting of the word referring to an
object. How an object || a kind of
object is hypostasized for a technique of
use. This word refers 2 to this→ object that word to
that→ object. Explanation of the object
referred to not by pointing but by explaining a technique.
Colour words,
shape words,
etc. Under what circumstances pointing can
explain i.e. convey the use of a
word. Not to a baby. It learns by
being drilled. There is therefore no occult act of
naming an object that in itself can give a
word a meaning. Words for coloured shape.
Word for colour on What does ‘now’ refer to or ‘this’ or ‘I’. The private object. The naming of the private object. The private language. The game someone plays with himself. When do we call it a game. If it resembles a public game. The diary of Robinson Crusoe. So we mustn't think that we understand the working of a word in language if we say it is a name which we give to some sort of an experience which we have. The idea is 3 here: we
have something it is as it were before the
mind's eye (or some other sense)
& we give it a name. What could be
simpler? One might say || could put it roughly
this way: All ostensive
definition explains the use of a word only
when it makes one last determination, removes one last
indeterminacy. |
The relation
between name & object.
Language game of builder.
What is the relation between names & actions, names
& shapes? The relation of ostensibly
4 a technique of using it & that
technique can be private; but this only means that nobody but I know
about it in the sense in which I can have a private sewing
machine. But in order to be a private sewing machine, it
must be a
sewing machine || an object which would deserve || deserves
that name || the name sewing machine not
in virtue of its privacy but in virtue of its similarity to
sewing machines private or otherwise. |
Now why do we say: My
feelings are my private property. Because
only I am directly aware of my pain. But what does that
mean. I suppose to be aware of pain means to feel
it, & isn't it ‘my’ pain because I
feel it. So what does it mean to say only I feel my
pain. We have, so far, not given any sense to the phrase I
feel his pain (except in the sense I feel 5 the same kind of pain or perhaps I
vividly imagine his pain) & therefore no use to the phrase I feel my pain
either. (I don't say that we
couldn't arrange for a sense for these phrases.)
We could of course use the proposition
‘A person is directly aware of his pain only &
indirectly aware of the other
man's’ as a grammatical rule
[Bestimmung] to the effect that if I say of
N. “N. is directly
|
Here
too however the expressions ‘directly aware
& indirectly
aware’ are very || extremely misleading. What gives us
the idea that the person who feels pain is aware of an
object, as it were, sees an object || it, whereas we are only 6 told that it's
there but can't see it? It is the peculiar
function of the verbs like
feeling, seeing etc. But before explaining
what I mean I must make a preliminary remark. For I know
that some of you will think this is the worst kind of
verbalism. So I must make a general remark about
grammar & reality. Roughly speaking the
relation of the grammar to reality is that || of
expressions to the facts which 7 is arbitrary. But in a most
important sense it is not. It has a most important reason
lying both in the size & in the irregularity of shape & in the use we make of a room that we
don't measure its dimension in μ. or even in
mm. That is to say not only the proposition which tells us
the result of measurement but also the description of the
method & unit of measurement tells us something about the
world 8 that this verbal
expression is in the first person used to replace
an expression of pain. So that if
some people say that ‘having pain’
in the end refers to pain behaviour we can
answer them, that ‘I have pain’ does not refer to
pain behaviour but is a pain behaviour. It
corresponds to a cry of pain not to the statement I am crying.
But surely you distinguish between my pain behaviour when I
just behave 9 you're bold enough to say
‘pain’ then the statement becomes
tautologous. If you want to avoid the mention of pain
because this already presupposes that we know
what is behind his expression then it doesn't help you to
say ‘a certain feeling’ or ‘a certain
something’ for how do you know that you are allowed to call
it a feeling or even a something. For
the word something has a public meaning 10 which is to justify his use of a pain
expression by a series of different objects which he has at
different times when he says he has pain. ‘But
surely the use of the word pain is based on the fact that he
‘recognises’ his private object as always
being the same on those occasions!’
What's he mean in this case by being the
‘same’, or ‘recognising’,
neither he nor we have ever learnt to apply these words 11 object at all & no more has
he. |
( || [This
paper if it is in the least like || as || what I think it ought to be should at
first sight be very confusing indeed. For in
this case it apparently consists of a mixture of
trivialities & paradoxes & why
I should say them seems pretty unclear.) || ]
|
For to say that he has a private object
means that we shall regard no description which he may give of
it as really telling us what it's like.
We assume 12 case to call
‘analogous’? |
If you cheat others at
least don't cheat yourself; and if you
don't cheat yourself – why should you cheat the
others? |
In fact the private object is one about which
neither he who has it nor he who hasn't got it can say
anything to others or to himself. |
But what you say always sounds as though you wished
13 entirely constructed to suit
the grammar of the common objects in question. & it
becomes an absurdity if its nature is supposed to explain that
grammar. |
We can express this as
follows: There is no justification for an
utterance of pain in the sense in which there is
for my saying that someone else is in pain. There is no essentially private justification for I couldn't know whether anything that is |
There is
something in front of me which justifies me in saying there is a
table in front of me. |
As introduction: Word referring to an object. Using a word analogously to certain cases. Equality & the criteria of equality. Imagining, making an image & making use of the image. |
Recognising the object as
the same you had before. But if we use 14 the words
‘recognise’ & ‘same’ he
must be justified in saying that he recognises the object as
the same. Can his recognition be
infallible? No; for he may be || can go
wrong in the use of the word ‘same’. || No, for we may say that he goes wrong in the
application of the word
‘same’. |
He recognises; but suppose he went wrong, would
it make any difference? But what is it like to be
right in this case? |
We can't e.g. discuss |
If we imagine anything that we should call a
justification, some private regularity, it must be
something which, if we saw it, we should call a regularity.
But what would in our case mean seeing his private
regularity? We haven't given it any
sense. That is, we have indeed given the expression to feel
what he feels sense but with 15 particular criteria for the
identity. If we now talk of identity &
don't wish to use these criteria we are left
without any unless we give fresh ones. And of course I know
perfectly well that we are thinking of criteria similar to the ones of
physical objects only we can't apply any such criteria
in our case & that's what we mean by
talking of the privacy of the objects. Privacy
here really means the absence of means |
But suppose I say: ‘I have the
same sensations now as five minutes ago’ – what
criterion of identity am I 16 using? – What
criterion am I using for determining that what I feel is pain,
or that what I see is red? None. There
are criteria which can convince me that I am using the word
‘red’ or ‘pain’ as they are
normally used in English. I can point to
something & say: ‘The colour of
this you do call ‘mauve’, don't
you?’ etc. |
That's to say: In ‘I feel what
I felt 5 min. ago’ I have no justification
analogous to the case … 17 in
tennis. |
Memory can be compared with a storehouse only so far as it
fulfils the same purpose. Where it
doesn't, we couldn't say whether the things stored
up may not constantly change their nature & so
couldn't be said to be stored at all. |
But don't we say two
sensations are equal when we find them equal &
isn't finding them so the justification for saying
it? But how do we recognise ‘finding two
|
He learns to use the word; & then,
whenever … , he says
‘ ….’ What are the circumstances
under which he then says …?
Could we say: ‘ … & then
whenever he feels pain he says
… ’? or ‘ … &
then, whenever he has a certain feeling he
says …’? or ‘ …
& then, whenever he has something
particular he says …’?
|
But if he is truthful, why
shouldn't we 18 take his word for it that he sees
red? But we do! That's to say we
believe that he is not telling us a lie. – But if he
is intelligent as well, why shouldn't we
believe that what he has before our || his
mind's eye is red. We do, – according to
the method of comparison applicable in this case.
‘Then where do you disagree with us?’
– When you talk about something incommunicable,
private. |
You seem to deny the
existence of something; 19 assume that our memory at
each instant cheats us & that we use the
expression bona fide to express something
different each time. So that one might say: it
doesn't matter what is behind the expression so
long as it is a bona fide expression of it. |
Our answer is: Why do you think
that a cry would be the expression of the background if
there is || were one? In what sense
would the cry for me point to such
|
‘A cry
with something, & a cry without
something.’ |
The grammar
of an expression can't be investigated by
transforming the expressions, particularly when they
all 20 make use of the same
picture. You have to remind yourself of the use to get out
of the rut in which all these expressions tend to keep you.
|
The whole point of investigating
the ‘verification’ e.g. is to
stress the importance of the use as opposed to that of the
picture. |
In this way we have to
investigate the use of ‘cry with … ’
& ‘cry without … ’ although of
course there are plenty of pictures ready taken from other uses
|
Comparing measuring time with measuring
lengths. To get rid of the confusing picture remind
yourself exactly how we measure time. |
The difficulty here is that those
pictures are terribly insistent, forcing us to see
everything in their likeness. |
Words with & without sense. |
The application of a word (say
‘with’) compares this case with other
cases. But we're just questioning how far
this comparison holds. So we must remind ourselves of
facts which these words don't suggest. |
“But surely, I know what pain is
& that I always have just that when I say ‘I
have pain’”. Doesn't it strike
you as odd that you should know so well what pain is, now
when you haven't got it?! This
|
‘But you can't describe 21 the phenomenon
that people feel || of people
feeling pain by describing their pain
behaviour. You do know that
there's more to it than that. In your own case
you know that all that happens isn't that under certain
external circumstances you do & say such &
such things.’ – In your own case you know
that what's meant by feeling pain is entirely independent of
external circumstances, & as to internal ones the only one
that matters is feeling pain. |
How would I justify my
pain-behaviour in order to show to someone that I
wasn't just acting in this way? I would
add more expressive behaviour. |
But when I in my own case distinguish between,
say, pretending that I have pain & really having pain,
surely I must make this distinction on some
grounds! Oddly enough – no! –
I do distinguish but not on any grounds.
|
.. But if you say 22 this aren't you saying that
all the phenomenon of human pain is a phenomenon of
behaviour? |
If we assume a
justification behind the expression of feeling & if we
then try to describe this justification it turns
out that it isn't a justification
after all, that we have to say things about it which take
away its character of justification. |
It is as though I said: this man is |
‘This feeling of mine, however you call it,
justifies my behaviour’. – This already
presupposes that you can use the word
‘feeling’. |
Common idea: a word has meaning by referring to
something. There is a connection between a
word & an object. What
sort of connection? 23 Is it something like this:
the word reminds us of the
object? What happens when a
thing reminds me of something? Seeing M
reminds me of his father.
Let's say roughly seeing M || so &
so produces in me thoughts about
Ms father || his
father & || or
images of Ms father.
(Remark) The sentence I imagine
M is || so & so is not a
description of a picture before my
mind's eye. Ask yourself do you
recognise M's father || him
from the picture before your mind's
eye? Would you say: I see a man
with white hair etc. 24 a picture || what
we believe a picture represents whereas their use is to give
a picture an interpretation. – It is useful here
to imagine that a man imagines by means of drawing or
painting, sketching or even by producing a cartoon film. If
you said that in order to draw he must already have a
mental picture which he copies, the answer is, that the mode of
projection used to copy his mental picture is not determined
& the latter therefore
may || might be anything, so that in fact |
‘Is there then
no such thing as a mental picture?’ The proper
answer to a question thus worded would be || is: ‘People at
times have mental pictures || images’. But this
isn't really the sort
of answer we wanted. We meant to ask: have we a
right, under the circumstances under 25 which it's normally said
that a person || man sees || has a mental image, to say that he has such an image or
picture? Have we a right to say that a
man || someone
marries || married money? This may mean did he
‘marry money’ or is the expression an
appropriate one. Think of the ways in which such a
question is decided? – Suppose we ask the
question: are people murdered in
tragedies or aren't they? One answer
is: In some tragedies some
people are murdered& not in
others || . Another answer:
‘people aren't really murdered
26 be a peasant, he is really
Gloucester's son.’
We
shall say the word ‘really’,
‘pretend’, ‘die’
etc. are used in a peculiar way when we talk of a play
& differently in ordinary life. Or:
the criteria for a man dying in a play
aren't
¤ the same as
those of his dying in reality.
But are we justified to say that
Lear dies at the end of
the play? Why not. And, analogously, that
there is no reason for objecting to saying we have || see
a mental 27 |
Back to the function
of words! We could imagine a use of language in
which the words were used to bring pictures || images before our minds, an image for each word, or
some thought concerning the
object mentioned. As when we read a list
of names of people whom we know & reading imagine them or
think various thoughts about them. And to amplify
the || my idea I can assume that the person who reads the
list 28 ‘fact the sentence refers
to’ before one's mind. What is
true in this is that there is a connection between the capability to
produce such a picture & understanding. But
the idea that understanding means producing such a picture of
something similar is quite wrong. When we philosophise we are
constantly bound to give an account 29 the verb stands for this
activity. The use of the word understanding however
is such that it would be || is very
misleading to say it refers to an activity.
Lots of activities are signs that we have understood.
The technique of use of the verb
‘understanding’ is very || most similar to the technique of use of
the verb ‘to be able to’. In particular
in such cases as ‘to be able to play |
A
philosophical problem
is || can be solved only in the right
surrounding. We must surround
it || the case by examples which force us to
compare it to || We must give the problem a new
surrounding we must compare it to cases¤
|
If we describe the language game
of fetching coloured things it could || might seem that we only describe it superficially, because
the real game is played with impressions,
& these we haven't mentioned at all in our
description. It seems as if we hadn't really gone
to the bottom of it. |
We
always forget that ‘impressions’ is a peculiar
grammatical form, & |
Talking about impressions
already means to look at phenomena in one particular way,
i.e., to think about them in one
particular fashion. |
‘What does green look like to
me? – It looks like
this→ to me.’ – |
“This is the colour
31 impression which
I'm calling
‘green’”. |
Am I sure
I'm talking about my private impression?
And how can I be sure? Do I feel that
I'm talking about the impression? What
happens? I look at a green patch, I concentrate my
attention on such a patch & I say these
words. But on what kind of
patch? Not on a green one. On one which seems
to deserve the name green? |
It is not true that I see
impressions before me & that they are the primary
objects. |
In the sense
in which I can't explain ‘what green
looks like to me’ I can't say that I know what it
looks like either. |
Swapping experiences. |
Having a particular use of the word in mind. |
The difference between 32 ‘Now I know the
formula’ & ‘Now I can go
on’. |
The
difference between saying the formula & saying
‘Now I know the
formula’ |
The importance of the if-feeling. |
The ‘conditional feeling’ not
unlike seeing a vowel coloured. |
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