|
|
It would be a genuine mathematical problem:
‘construct the 2-gon’.
And a [M|m]athematician might solve the problem
i.e. devise a construction which on such
& such grounds we should could hardly
help calling “construction of the
2-gon”. • |
|
We1 may, or we may not, feel a discomfort about
it. |
| Suppose
[s|I] said “there is something there”;
& on being asked,
“[w|W]hat do you mean?”, I painted a
picture of what I see. Would this justify
saying saying that statement? –
Wouldn't this picture have to be understood as
‘in a system’? And
mustn't I understand 2. it as an
expression within a system? |
|
|
‘Look at the ˇgeometrical proposition as
a member of the whole system of geometrical
props, then you shall see whether you
really want to
|
|
p ∙ ~~p = p
= ~~p |
|
⌊⌊sehr wichtig wenn auch schlecht
gesagt⌋⌋ “It's no use saying that
the other person knows what he sees & not
what I see & that therefore all is symmetrical,
because there is just nothing else corresponding to my visual image;
my visual image is unique!” |
|
|
“Obviously this↗) is what's
seen!” |
| If
one sais to the solipsist
John Smith
“so you say that of all people only John
[s|S]mith really sees”, he
doesnt really recognize
this to be his view. He didn't really mean
that if you regard him as one man amongst other men person out
of many people he had any special privilege. –
He would be inclined to say: “Not John
Smith has any particular privilege (it would be
ridiculous to say this), but I have, as seen
by myself. |
|
Couldn't one assume that all those persons had a right to
talk about what's seen who were being seen.
I.e. all those who were one a picture
could talk about the picture. |
|
“But I can persuade myself that nobody else has pains even
if they say they have, but not that I
haven't.” It makes no sense to say, that “I persuade myself that I have no pain” whoever says this. I don't say anything about myself when I say 4 that I can't persuade myself
that I haven't pain etc.. |
| Can't I use the word
“to see” in such a way that I call only this→
‘seen’?” But how do I act according to this decision? Do I, e.g. admit that someone else besides me can see it, or do I say that only I can see it? Suppose everybody talked only about what we should now describe as ‘What's seen by me L.W.’. But they all know what I see; they don't ask me. And if anybody describes it wrongly we say that he
|
| Su If I say
“I see this→” I am liable to
tap my chest to show which person I am. Now suppose I had
no head & pointing to my geometrical eye I would point to
a⌊n⌋ ˇempty place above my neck, wouldn't I still
5 feel that I pointed to the
person who sees ta⌊p⌋ping my chest? Now I might ask
d “how do I know in this case who sees
this?” But what is
this. It's no use ˇjust pointing
ahead of me, & if, instead, I point to a description &
tap both my chest & the description & say
‘I see this’ – it
|
|
25 × 25 =
625 3 + 1 = 5 π = 3˙141 31 π ≠ 3˙15 |
|
Der, wenn ich so sagen darf, krankhafte Charakter des Solipsismus
zeigt sich wird offenbarzeigt sich,
wenn wir die Consequenz zu ziehen versuchen
daß nur ich N.N. wirklich sehe, da
wir vor dieser Consequenz sofort
zurückschrecken. Wir sehen 6. sofort, daß wir das gar
nicht sagen wollten. |
/ | Isn't it queer that if I
look & point in front of me & point in
front of me & say “this!”, I should
know what ˇit is I mean. “I mean just
these shades of colour and shapes, the
appearance.” |
| [Ein Wissenschaftler sagt er
betreibe nur empirische Wissenschaft oder ein
Mathematiker nur Mathematik & nicht Philosophie, –
aber er ist auch den Versuchungen der Sprache
unterworfen & muß sich wie
jeder, er ist in der gleichen Gefahr wie jeder
Andre &
muß sich vor ihr in [A|a]cht nehmen.] |
/ | If I say
“I mean the appearance”, it seems that,
though I had sa[y|i]d ⌊am⌋ tell⌊ing⌋ you what it is I am pointing
7. used to say so often:
“I believe I mean something, if I say
‘ …’”. |
∕∕ | It seems that the visual
|
∕∕ | This object seems to
be ˇis
8 that here seems to be an object I can
point to & talk about, it was just that I was comparing it
with to a physical object. For
o⌊n⌋ly on second thought it appears that the idea of
“talking about” isn't applicable
here. (I could have compared the
‘object’ to a theater
decoration.) |
/ | Now under when could I
be said to speak about
But what is the point in this case o[t|f]o say⌊ing⌋ that when I describe to myself what I see I describe a an (peculiar) object called “what is seen”? Why talk of a particular object here? Isn't this due to a misunderstanding? |
|
Imagine a game played on a kind of
chessboard. You can extend the game to 64, 81,
100, etc. squares & the situation which is
loosing in the 64-game is winning 9 in the 81-game, loosing
in the 100-game, winning in the 121-game
etc.. What di If you are asked “what did ‘meaning what he said’ consist in” you will describe
|
| “Can I
imagine 10101010 = μ
[S|s]oldiers in a
row?” “Can I imagine an endless row of [S|s]oldiers?” Why shouldn't I say, I can imagine an endless row of soldiers? the image is something like a row the end of which I can't see & a gesture & the words “on & on for ever –” said in a particular tone of voice. And suppose I said: μ soldiers would reach from here halfway to the sun if we placed them a yard apart!? Isn't this too ‘imagining the row’? |
∕∕ | It is a very remarkable &
ˇmost important fact that there are numbers which
we all of us should call
“
|
| There is a particular way of
explaining the sense (meaning) of an expression which we may
call
10 |
|
In philosophy we often say that people wrongly imagine a
certain state of afairs, e.g.
“they imagine that a law o⌊f⌋ nature in some way
compels things to [p|h]appen”, ort
“they imagine that it's a question of psychology
how a person can know a certain fact whereas it is one of
grammar” etc. etc..
But it is necessary in these cases to explain what it
means “to imagine this so &
so”, what kind of image is it they are using.
It often sounds as though they were able to imagine the logically
impossible & it is not easy to straighten out our
description of the case & to say what ˇin this case
they actually imagine.
E.g.: People treat the question “how do we know what so & so is the case” as a question of psychology which has nothing to do with the sense of the prop which we say is known. But first: where do they take this idea from, how do they come by it? Which ˇreally psychological question are they thinking of? There Obviously there is a case in which the question “how does he find this out” is a personal &, perhaps, psychological 11 one. “How did he
find out that N was in his room?” –
He saw him through the window or he was hidden under the bed. – “How did he find out that the
glas was cracked?” He saw the
krack with his naked eye or he saw it through the
gl magnifying glass
etc. We say he finds out the same thing in
different ways & therefore not that what he finds
depends upon how he finds it. When do we say that he finds out the same thing in two ways? Imagine language games: somebody is asked a question “A?” & trained to answer “yes” if he sees a
Now concider the ostensive definition: “This man is called ‘A’” & ask yourself whether this definition tells us whether ⌊if⌋ we are to regard seeing A from a different 12 side or in a different position or
hearing his voice as criteria of him being there? –
Here we are tempted to say: “But surely I just
point to this man, so there can't be any doubt
what object I am meaning!” But that's
wrong though the doubt of course is not whether I mean this
→ or that
↘ thing.
One may say that the ‘object’ I am inclined to say I am pointing to ˇin the ostensive definition is not determined by the act of pointing but by the use I make of the word defined. And here one must beware of thinking that after all even if the pointing finger pointed to a different object in the sense in which the arrow ⟶
“But we conceive of objects, things, different from our sensedata, e.g. the table as opposed to the views we get of it.” But what does conceiving of this object consist in? Doesn't it is it a peculiar ‘mental act’ occuring whenever, say, we talk about the table? Isn't it using the word table in 13 the game we do use
it? using it as we do use it? |
|
We are tempted to say that the word
“toothache” is the ‘name of a feeling of
which I don't know whether anybody except me ever
has it’. But even I can be said not to
know whether I always mean the same by this word.
|
| “I always
thought that holding one's cheek was having toothache; then
he knocked out a tooth of mine, then I knew what
‘toothache’ meant”. Well what
does it mean? –
|
∕∕ / | “Now I know what
‘pain’ means”. |
| A
faked moan ˇof pain
isn't something necessarily a moan without
something & a real moan ˇof pain a moan with
something. |
|
Aber wir möchten sagen: “die
Begleitumstände sind andere”. Aber daran ist
etwas Unrichtiges. |
|
You say in one case the expression 14 corresponds to the
Imagine, you were wrong about the correspondence, then what would remain? That you said these words & that you did not cheat, but now cheating & not cheating are not ‘private experiences’. It's no good saying “I recognize this experience as … ” as ˇ can say I don't know whether I recognize the experience of recognizing rightly. |
|
We are using the word “to
cheat” in two different ways. In one way whether I
do it can be verified by the other person, in the other sense we say
“only I know whether I cheat”. |
| “I knew all the time
that I had cheated.” |
|
Quite true, we distinguish simple acting & acting
prompted by feeling, & feeling with
|
| Can one by
multiplying 2 with itself
15 |
|
“Mere behaviour”.
“There is only behaviour” would seem to say that
there was no life that we (or I) acted as
automatons, as unconscious
mashines. I wish to say: “The difference between me & a mashine doesn't
But oughtn't I say that this only distinguishes a machine from me not from a human being? For why shouldn't I say that the difference between a human being, animal, sewing machine, etc., lies in their actions, if I except myself. But then I dont even except my body. |
|
“I know consciousness only from myself, I
don't know whether anybody else is
conscious has consciousness, but it makes sense
to assume it & I do make the assumption in
|
| What
worries us is the idea of ‘behaviour +
[E|e]xperience’. – We might think
that it was possible to talk of behaviour without ˇthere being
experience. ‘Could I talk about moaning if there
was no such thing as hearing the moaning?’
Or: Does Isn't talking of
behaviour
¤ 16 |
|
“I want someone to explain to me a certain
game & to make it
eas[y|i]⌊er⌋
I put the question to him: “tell me what a man does to
winn the game.” Someone might say
“I don't want to know what a man does to win it,
this is a question about human beings; I want to want to
know what the game is they play.” The analogy we might be mislead by is this: you ask the question “ You ask, what does it mean that “a rod is 6 inches long”. Someone answers one finds [it|ou]t whether it is so by using a measuring rod divided into equal parts. “What does this mean?” – One divides it into equal parts in such & such a way. I have given a definition in terms of the way of verification. “But isn't this an indirect definition?” Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. Sometimes how we look for something may determine what we are looking for, sometimes it doesn't. – We are always liable to think of the fact that we can find out that there is a chair here in many different ways & we forget that this is just conditioned by the particular use we make of the word “chair”, “table” & in general the generic names of physical 17. objects. ⌊⌊
[s|S]upposing we said “what does it mean
to have an enla⌊r⌋ged liver & someone answered
“we ver[y|i]fy it by looking at the
persons eye & seeing
…” ⌋⌋ Describe an object by describing its use. Describe an object by saying what hollow it fits into. More ore less of it's use is expressed by different forms of a prop. Concider this! The sense of a prop is what you must know to understand it. What does understanding a question consist in? What does it mean to understand a mathematical question? Would you understand ‘25 × 25 = ?’ if you didn't know how to calculate it? Would you say you understood
Now concider such a question as “are there an inf. nr. of primes or not, 18 & if not, how
many?” I show you what we call a prime
nr. & ask you if you
understand this question. Prima
facie you all say yes. Now I want to show you that you
could also look at it from a different & perhaps more
‘exact’ point of view & say
‘no’. We have here a question but we have
not yet got a method of it's solution & I want
you to think of it in terms of 25 × 25 = ? when we
don't know what multiplication is. Now
I'll say (what I've said in a similar case
before): The question for you gets it's
sense by the idea picture of a small finite
nr. of cardinals
etc.. But what does that mean?
In the case of the small nr of
cardinals you have a method, you know what to do, here you
don't know it, so
19 us
Euler's proof we say
that now we know the answer to the question we have asked.
But are we bound to express ourselves in this way?
Can't I persuade you to adopt a different way of
expressing ourselves of which too we can't say that it is
inconsistent with the usual use of
words? What if I say: This question
i.e. the form of words was indeed suggested by
the finite case, but the analogy just brakes
down because there is no method of solution.
Eulers
“proof”
needn't be conceived as answering the question
“how many primes are
there”. This question might perfectly well be said to be nonsensical. (As e.g. “what colour has visual space.”). “But is it in our power to regard as question as nonsensical or as making sense? And what about Eulers proof?” Need we ask such a question as “how many cardinal numbers are there”? This question which seems in some way to get hold of the infinite i.e. the enormous for this reason might appeal to some of us & might, on the other hand, repell some of us, – e.g. me. Funeral Concider such a prop as: “There are as many squares as there are cardinals”. If we look at it like this: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 … we should be 20. inclined to say that there
were less squares than cardinals; if we think
of them as 1²,
2², 3², 4², …, we
shou say, there are as many. ⌊⌊
Thinking in terms of an analogy doesnt mean
that this analogy is constantly before our mind. The
Idea of finding out something about the series of
cardinals. ⌋⌋ Why shouldn't we draw the
conclusion that this whole question doesn't make
sense? But we actually say that it does, &
part of it's charm that the answer is in a
way paradoxical adds ˇfor some to it's
charm. (Some + some = some). It
seems to us that we have discovered a new element with utterly
different properties. I should like to get rid of this analogy. – Can “the heptagon be
constructed?” – A
“Now surely this question makes
sense!” – B “Now
surely this question makes no sense!” –
What argument would A use: “you know what it
means ‘to construct the pentagon,
21. was a heptagon
constr.’ –
answer: I don't know what you're talking
about. “But what about the proof that the heptagon
can't be constructed? As there is such a proof,
it is the answer to that question of which you say it makes no
sense. “Must I conceive of this proof as the
answer to that question?” When the
proof is given I can say: you have now given the
expression 13 gon sense
& you have decided that the expression construction of the
7 gon is
|
| Now back to the question
“how many 777 are there in
π.” When I say
that the case of the small first
nr. gives this question its first meaning
this is to say that our attitude towards this expression is due to it
sounding like that other kind of question. Our attitude can
however change if I now remind you of the cases
I've just been talking about. Why should we ask
this question? – “But don't
mathaticians try to solve it , or
similar questions?” 22. Why should we call what
they are doing “trying to solve this
question”. Why should we not say they add new
constructions to mathematics. Now
concider this expression:
“Surely, either there are n times 777 in
π or not!” A)
this is a tautology, B) if it means that you can't
help yourself & must ask this question, I contradict you
& say that you needn't look at it that way. – Now e.g. you say that the
difficulty about that question is that the
prop. “there are 777 in
π” can only be proved in a general
way, whereas the prop.
‘there are’ can be proved by finding a case of 777
in the deveopment. I should say let that
teach you something about the sense of the question!
Remember that a position or a move in a game gets its sense from
the game. We are liable to get the idea that the
mere form of words has something ◇ in it which we must find
or of which we must say that we can't find it.
Now to the question “are there 777 in μ places”. “Surely there are, or there aren't”. This means nothing more nor less than “We know what it means to say 23 ‘that there
are’ or ‘that there
aren't’. Now it is obvious that we
can't straightforwardly say we know in this case what
it means, because to explain what it means we should have to point to
small numbers & why should I accept this explanation for
μ? This is all without much
interest as long as I dont actually
set the task “find out about
μ” for we could use
μ as example though we never thought of
answering the question with respect to
μ! – But if now we try to
find a new method of calculating the answer for
μ then indeed we may ask ourselves in
what sense we can be said to answer the old question, in what sense we
can say that we've found a shortcut. It will depend on the method actually
applied. Ask yourself: What are we to do if
somebody actually calculated
f(μ) by
counting & found a different answer? I
should say: to attribute it to human frailty ‘that we
can't develope all places of
π’ is just thoughtless, you
wouldn't talk like that if you saw the use of your words
clearly. But this is like saying: to say
0:0 = 1
is thoughtlessness you would not say so if … But one can
never 24 know this & someone
might say this & we would respect it.
Contradiction. What are we to say if someone tells us about a proof: “that all mathematical questions can be solved”. One can use an appelation for a ‘proof’ without regarding it as the answer to a question. |
|
¤⌊⌊⌋⌋ ⟶ … talking of experience & therefore
talking what we call “talking of
private experience” a special case of “talking about
‘behaviour’”? |
| Onem might
put it by saying: “Experience is the
at the bottom of everything we say about phenomena; so if we call
anything in particular talking about ˇdirect
experiences it must be ˇjust a special case of talking
about phenomena as the ordinary way. |
| If we say “toothache is nothing
but behaviour” we seem to say that it is not so & so,
we seem to wish to exclude something.,
But that's obviously what we mustn't
do. |
| “Toothache is not a
behaviour but an
[E|e]xperience.” “We
distinguish between ‘behaviours’ and
‘experiences’. “Dancing is
a behaviour, [T|t]oothache an experience.”
Th[i|e]s⌊e⌋
[is|are]
grammatical statements. About the use of the words
“dancing” &
“toothache”. |
|
(“This form of words seems to mean something but means
nothing”. That is: We connect a
certain image with this expression or we are inclined to use it
because it sounds analogous to other expressions & we connect
a certain at attitude, state of mind
etc. with it; but if we then ask ourselves how we are
going to use it we find that we have no use for it ore a use
of a totally different kind from that, which we at first vaguely
imagined[.| (]expected).) |
| First of all it seems that we are
partial for ‘behaviour’ that we wish to explain
everything in terms of it.
[n|N]ow why should we be in
th biased in this way? Is it
because of some kind of materialisme?
|
| There is an
ordinary (& unproblematic) way
of using such a word as “toothache”, but we are
inclined to give on philosophizing about it to give
it a different use finding out however that we can then do away with
it entirely because that proposed use ˇas a matter of
fact makes it into a useless symbol. |
| “We use the expression
‘x has toothache’ when we
|
| I wish
to say that we can't
adduce the ‘private experience’ as a justification |
| We can't say “he is
justified in moaning because he has pains” if we call pain
the justification for moaning. – We
can't say “he is justified in expressing pain,
because he has pain” unless we wish to distinguish this case
of being justified in expressing pains from another way of
justification, e.g. that he is on the stage
& has to act a sick man. |
|
If I am tempted to say “my justification for moaning
is to h having pain”, it seems I point
– at least
|
|
The idea is here that there is an
‘expression’ for everything, that we know what it
means ‘to express something’, ‘to
describe something’. Here is a feeling, an
experience, & now I could say to someone “express
it!”. But what is to be the relation
bet of the expression to what it
expresses? In what way is this expression the expression
of this feeling rather than another?! One is
inclined to say “we mean this feeling by this
expression”, but what is meaning |
| “We have two
expressions: one for moaning without pain, & one for
moaning with pain.” To what states of
affairs am I pointing as ⌊an⌋ explanations of these
two expressions? “But these ‘expressions’ [k|c]an't be mere words, noises, which you make, they get their importance only from what's behind them (the state you're in, when you use them)!” – But how can this state imp give importance to noises which I produce? Suppose I said: The expressions get their importance from the fact, that they are used not used coolly but that we can't help using them. This is as though I said: laughter gets it's importance only through being a natural expression, a natural phenomenon not an artificial
Now what makes a ‘natural form of expression’ natural? Should we say: “An experience which stands behind it”? |
| If I use the expression
“I have toothache” I may think of it as
‘being used” naturally’ or
otherwise[.|;]
[B|b]ut it
would be wrong to say that I had a reason for thinking
either. – ‘It is very queer that
all the importance of our expressions seems to
come from that X, ˇY, Z, the private experiences,
which for ever remain in the background &
can't be drawn into the foreground. But is a cry when it is a cry of pain not a mere cry? |
| Can one say: ‘If
I teach the child the use (meaning) of the word toothache
I can only hope that it really feels toothache, (or, that
it feels real toothache) for if it doesn't then
I've taught him a wrong meaning”? |
| Why should I say that the
‘expression’ derives its meaning from the
feeling behind it, – & not from the
circumstances of the lang. game in
which it is used. For imagine a person crying out with pain
alone in the desert: is he using a language?
[S|C]ould we say that his cry had
meaning? |
| We
|
|
“But can't you imagine people behaving
just as we do, showing pain etc., etc.
& then if you imagine that they don't feel
pain all their behaviour is, as it were, dead. You can
imagine all their behaviour with or without
pain. –” |
| The
pain
|
| Suppose we say that the image I use
in the one case is different from that which I use in the
other. But I can't point to the two
images. So what does it come to, to say this, except just
⌊to⌋ saying it, using
this expression. We are, as I have said, tempted to describe our language by not saying that we use certain elements, images, which however in the last moment |
| Isn't the
word expression in it's use
an image, – why do I refer back to an image which I
can't show? |
|
“But don't you talk as though
(the) pain wasn't ˇsomething
terribly real?” – Am I to understand
this as a prop. about
pain? I suppose it is a
prop. about the use of the word
‘pain’; & it is one more
|
|
Feeling justified in having expressed pain I may
concentrate on the memory of pain. |
| Now what's the
difference between using my expressions as I do but yet not using
“toothache” to mean real pain & the proper
use of the word? – |
|
The
private experience is to serve as a paradigme
& at the same time we adm
admitedly it can't be a
paradigme. |
|
The ‘private experience’ is a
ˇdegenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a
sense to tautology & contradiction). And
|
| What would
it mean to deny the existence of pain?! |
| “But when we say we have toothache
we don't just talk of
|
|
We say “only he knows whether he says the
truth or
l[i|y]es.”
“Only you can know if what you say is
true.” Now compare secrecy with the ‘privateness’ of personal experience’! In what sense is a thought of mine secret? If I think |
|
“Only you can know what colour you
seen” But if it is true that
ˇonly you can know, you can't ever import this
knowledge, nor can you express it. Why shouldn't we say that I know better than you what colour you see if you say the wrong word & I can make you agree to my word, or if you point to the wrong sample etc.? |
|
“I didn't know that I was
lying.” – “You must have
known!” – |
|
⌊Examine:⌋ “If you don't know
that you're having toothache, you
arent
|
| “I don't just say
‘I've got
This sentence distinguishes between, say, saying it as an example of a sentence, or on the stage etc., & saying it as an assertion. But it is no explanation of the expression |
| “I know what the word
[“| ‘]toothache[”| ’]
means, it makes me concentrate my attention on
|
|
“I know what the word
‘toothache’ means, it produces one particular
|
| But how does this queer delusion come
about?! |
| Here is
language, –, & now
|
| Privacy of
sensedata. I must
bore you by a repetition of what I said last time. We said
that peo one reason for introducing
the idea of the sense datum was that people, as we say,
somet⌊i⌋mes see different things, colours
e.g. when the looking at the same
object. Cases in which we say “he sees dark red
objects whereas I see light red”. This
We then are inclined to talk about an object other than
the physical object which the person sees who is said to see
the phys. obj.. It is further clear that we only gather from
the other persons behaviour
(e.g. what he tells us) what that
obj looks like & so it lies near to say
that he has this object before his mind's eye
& that we don't see it. Though we can
also say that we might have it before our mind
eye as well without however knowing that it is he has it
before his minds eye. The
‘sense datum’ ˇhere is the way
the physical object appears to him. In other cases no
phys object enters. Now I must draw your attention to one particular difficulty about the use of the ‘sense datum’. We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why shouldnt
“And remember that we admit that the other may have pain without showing it!” So wh if this is conceivable, why not that he never shows that he has pain;” & why not that everybody has pain constantly without showing it; or that even things have pain?!” What strikes us is that there seem to be a few usefull applications of the idea of the other persons having pain without showing it & a vast number of useless applications, applications which look as though they were no applications at all. And these latter applications seem to have their justification in this that we can imagine the other person to have what we have & in this way the prop that he has toothache seems to make sense appart from any expression at all. “Surely”, we say, “[We| I] can imagine him to have pain or to see, etc..” Or “As I can see myself so I can imagine him to do the same”. In other words I We arrive at the conclusion that imagining him to have pain (etc.) does not fix thes sense of the sentence “he has pain”. “He may all along mean something different by ‘green’ than I mean.” Evidence (Verification). But there is this consideration: “Surely I mean something particular, a particular impression & therefore he may have an other impression; surely I know what that would be like!” “Surely I know what it is like to have the impression I call ‘green’!” But what is it like? You are inclined to look at a green object & to say “it's like this!”. And these words though they don't explain anything to anybody else seem to be at any rate an explanation you give yourself. But are they?! Will this explanation justify your future use of the word ‘green’? In fact seeing green doesnt allow you to make the substitutions of someone else for you and of red for green. “The sensedatum is private” is a rule “But surely I distinguish between having toothache & expressing it, & merely expressing it”; & I distinguish between these two in myself.” “Surely this is not merely a matter of using different expressions, but there are two distinct experiences!” “You talk as though the case of having pain & that of not having pain were only distinguished by the way in which I expressed myself!” But do we always distinguish between ‘mere behaviour’ & ‘experience & behaviour’? If we see someone falling into flames & cr⌊y⌋ing out do we say to ourselves: “there are of course two cases …”? Or if I see you here before me do I distingu⌊i⌋sh?? Do you? You Can we say that ‘saying that I lie is justified by a particular experience of lying’. Shall we say ‘… by a particular priv. experience’? or ‘… by a part. priv. exp. of lying’? or ‘by a part. priv. exp. characterized in such & such ways’? “But what, in your opinion is the difference between the mere expression & the expression & the experience?” |
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“Do you know what it means that W. behaves as
he does but sees nothing; & on the other hand that he
sees?” If you ask yourself this & answer ‘yes’ you conger up some sort of image. This image is it seems derived
“I say ‘I have t’ because I feel it” contrasts this case with, say, the case of acting on the stage but can't explain what ‘having t’ means because having t = feeling t & the explanation would come to “I say I have it because I have it”. = I say I have it because it is true. = I say I have it because I don't ly. One wishes to say: In order to be able to say that I have t. I don't observe my behaviour, say in the miror. And this is correct, but it doesn't follow that you d[i|e]scribe an observation of any other kind. Moaning is not the description of an observation. ˇThat is You can't be said to derive your expression from what you observe. Just as you can't be said to derive the word ‘green’ from your visual impression but only from a sample. – Now against this one is inclined to say: “Surely if I call a colour green I don't just say that word, but the word comes in a particular way”, or “if I say I “But surely I know that I am not a mere automaton!” – What would it be like if I weren't? – “How is it that I can't imagine myself not
“I know that I see.” – “I see.” – you seem to read this off some fact; as though you said: “There is a chair in this corner.” “But if in an experiment, e.g. I say ‘I see’ why do I say so? surely because I see!” It is as though our expressions of personal experience needn't even spring from [c|r]egularly recurrent inner experiences but just from something. Confusion of description & sample. |
| The idea of the ‘realm of
consciousness’. |
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Sir it is
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