⌊⌊

Augustinus, in [den|the] Confession[en|s] I/8: [c|C]um (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam.⌋⌋

In these words we

get
have

– it seems to me – ⌊⌊In these words we are given, it seems to me,⌋⌋ a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of the language

name
designate

objects – sentences are combinations of such

names
designations

.
In this picture of ˇhuman language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.
Augustine ˇhowever does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. Whoever Anyone who ˇIf one describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks – I should imagine – primar[li|il]y of substantives, like “table”, “chair”, “bread” and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will

come
work

out all right. eventually.

Consider ˇnow this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which

I have written the signs
are the marks

: “five red apples”. He takes it to the groce[s|r]; the grocer opens the

draw
box

that has the

sign
mark

“apples” on it; then he looks [y|u]p the word “red” in a table, and finds opposite it a co[ul|lo]ured square; he now

pronounces
speaks

says out loud the series of cardinal

numerals
numbersch

– I assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word “five” and with each numeral he takes an apple from the box that has the colour of the square ˇfrom the draw. –

In this way & in similar ways one operates
This is how one works

with words. – “But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he has to do with the word ‘five’?” – Well, I am assuming that he a[s|c]ts, as I have described. The [e|E]xplanations come to an end somewhere. – ˇBut [W|w]hat[i|']s the meaning of the word “five”? – There was no question of any ˇsuch an entity ‘meaning’ here; only of the way in which “five” is used. // Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which “five” is used.

That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of ˇway of describing ◇◇◇ ˇpicture of the way in which our language functions. But

we
one

might a[s|l]so say ˇthat it is the notion ˇa picture of a more primitive language than ours.

Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help is to be the means ˇof communication between a bilder builder A to make himself understood by an and his assistant B.

assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building

blocks
stones

; there

are
is a supply of

cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the buildingstones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: “[C|c]ube”, “column”, “slab”, “beam”. A

calls
shouts

out the words; – B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.

Regard
Take

this as a complete primitive language.

Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; only not everything, ˇhowever, that we call language is this system.
(And this must be one must sa[i|y]d in ever s[l|o] many cases whe[r|n]e the question arises, : “can is this ˇan appropriate description be used or can't it be used? or ◇ not?”. The answer is, “Yes, it

is appropriate
can be used

; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you were profess[ing|ed] to describeˇ by it.” Think of the theories of the economists.)

It is as though someone explained: “Playing a game consists in moving things ab[i|o]ut on a surface according to certain rules …”, and we were to answered him: You

seem to be
are apparently

thinking of games played on a board; but th[o|e]se aren't all games the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicit[yl|ly] to those games.

Imagine a

type
way of writing

script in [h|w]hich ˇ◇◇◇ letters

stand for
are used to indicate

sounds, but ˇare used also

as accents
to indicate emphasis

and as marks of punctuation ˇsigns. (One can regard a

type
way of writing

script as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone

interpreted
understood

our
this

type
way of writing

script a[d|s] though it were one in which to every all letters there simply corresponded a just stood for sounds, and as though the letters ˇhere did not have other very also have quite different functions as well. – ˇSuch [A|a]n oversimplified view of the type our script like this one resembles is the analogon, I believe, ˇto Augustine's view of language.

If one considers we look at our example (2) one we may perhaps

get an idea of
begin to suspect

how far the

general
commonly accepted

concept of the meaning of ˇa words surrounds the

working
functioning

of language with a mist that makes clear

clear vision it impossibleˇ to see clearly. It scatters the The fog ˇis dispersed if we study the

workings
phenomena

of language in primitive kinds cases of ˇits application,

in which it is easy
where the simplicity enables one

to get a clear view of the ˇpurpose of way ˇthe words function and of what their purpose is. the way they function.
Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

could
might

imagine that the language ([3|4]) is the entire language of A and B; even the entire language of a tribe. The children are brought up to carry out just thesech activitiesˇ in question, to use just these such & such words and to react in just this such & such a way to the words of anothers.
An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the attention of the child's attention to them and at the same time pronouncing a word; for instanc[,|e], the word ‘slab’ in pointing to this block. (I do_n[o|']t want to call this “ostensive explanation” or “definition”, because the child can't ˇas yet ask what the thing is called. I will call it “ostensive teaching of words”. – I say

this
itch

will constitute an important part of the training, because th[at|is] is

so with
the case among

human beings, not because it we couldn't be imagined it

otherwise
differently

.) This ostensive teaching of thech words, one might say,

makes
fixes

an associative connection between the word and the thing. But what does that mean? Well, it may mean various things; but probably what first comes to one's mind is that occurs to one is that an image of the thing comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. But suppose that happens – is that the purpose

purpose sig of the word? – Yes, [i|I]t may be

it's
the

pu[s|r]pose aim. – I can imagine ˇsuch a use of words (i.e. here I mean i.e. series of sounds). having an application o[n|f] this sort. (Their utterance is so to speak the To pronounce them would be like striking of a key on

a
the

piano of

images
ideas

.) But in

our
the

language ([[2|3]| 4]) it is not the

aim
purpose

of the words to call up

images
ideas

. (Though it this may, of course, turn out that this is conducive be found to be helpful to their

purpose
real aim

.)
But if that is what the ostensive teaching brings about, – shall I say that it brings about the understanding of the word? Doesn't

he
someone

understand the

order
cry

“slab!” if he a[s|c]ts in such and such a way on hearing it? – The ostensive teaching ˇindeed helped to ptoduced produce bring this no doubt about, but only in connection with a certain

training
course of instruction

. With a different

training
course of instruction

the same ostensive teaching of these words would have brought about quite a different understanding. – Of th[at|is] more ˇat a later. point.
[“|“]When I By connecting ˇup the rod with th[e|is] lever ˇwith this rod by means of

a
the

peg, I make put the brake ready for use in order.” – Yes, given all the rest of the mechanism. Only together with this ˇmechanism is it a brake lever; and withoutch detached from its support it isn't even a lever, but

it may be anything
can be all sorts of things, or nothing

ˇIn the use of As the language ([3|4]) is used in practice the one party calls out the words and the other acts according to them. But [i|I]n the teaching instruction of th[e|is] language ˇhowever

you will find
there will bech

this procedure: the

pupil
one who is learning

calls the

blocks
objects

by ˇtheir names; that is, he

pronounces
speaks

the word when the teacher points to the

block
stone

. – In fact

we
you

will find here an evench the ◇◇◇ simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words

which
that

the teacher recites to him ˇpronounces for him: [B|b]oth processes ˇof these exercises

already primitive uses of
that resemble language.

language.
We may even imagine that the entire process of the use of the words ˇwe make in ([3|4]) is one of those games by means of which ˇour children learn our language. I will call these “language games”, and ˇI will frequently speak of a primitive language as a language game.
And one might call the

exercises
processes

of calling the

blocks
stones

by their names and of repeating the words that has been spoken out which the teacher has pronounced language games as well. Think of the various the uses that are made of words in nursery-rhymes.

Let us now consider an extension of the language ([3|4]): Besides the four words “cube”, “column” etc., let it contain a series of words that are app which is applied in the way in which the grocer in (2) applie[s|d] the numerals, – it

may
can

be the sri series of the le letters of the alphabet; further, ˇlet there be two words, which we may pronounce say let us choose “there” and “this”, since this ˇalready suggests roughly their purpose, – they are ˇto be used in connection with a pointing

gesture
movement of the hand

; and finally let us use certain

bits
little squares

of paper of various colours. A now gives a command of

this
the

sort: “d slab there” – at the same time letting the showing his assistant see a coloured square, and with the word “there” pointing to a ˇcertain place. B takes from the supply of slabs one a slab of the same colour of as the coloured square for each letter of the alphabet up to “d” and brings it to the place which A indicates. – On other occasions A gives the command “this there” – with “this” he points

at
to

a building

block
stone

– and so on.

When the child learns this language it has to learn the series of [“| “]numerals[”| ”] “a”, “b”, “c”, … by heart. – And it has to learn their use. Will an ostensive teaching of words

enter
come

into this

this instruction also? – Well, someone will point at slabs, for instance, and count: “a, b, c slabs”. ˇThere would be [A|a] greater similarity with between the ◇◇◇ ostensive teaching in example ([3|4]) would appear in and the ostensive teaching of numerals when if these are not used for counting but

refer to
rather to indicate

groups of objects that can be grasped

by
with

the eye. ˇIn [T|t]his is the way children learn the use of the first five or six cardinal number[.|m]erals ˇDo we teach Are “there” and “this” taught ostensively? –

Imagine
Think of

how

one
you

might teach their use. You point to places and things; – but

in this case
here

the pointing occurs in the use of the words

also
as well

, and not simply in the

teaching
learning

the use
it

. –

Now [W|w]hat do the words of this language denote? – How can this show itself – [w|W]hat they denote – except ˇhow is this to appear, unless in the way they are used? And this is what we have described. The expression, “this word denotes that ˇso & so” would have then to be ˇnow become a part of this description. Or: the description

is to
should

be put in the form: “The word … denotes …”.
Now one can it certainly ˇis possible to condense shorten the description of the use of the word “slab”

into saying
in this way, and say

that this word denotes this object. Th[at|is] is what one would do, for instance, if the question was were simply ˇ, for instance, to prevent the misunderstanding of thinking that the word “slab” referred to the kind of

block which
building stone that

we actually call ˇa “cube”,

and
while

the ˇparticular sort of “reference”

however
this is

, i.e.

all the rest of the game with
everything else about the use of

these words,

were
is

familiar.
Similarly one might say that the signs “a”, “b”, “c”, etc. denote numbers, when if this ˇis to removes the misunderstanding of thinking that “a”, “b”[b|,] “c”, play the role in

our
the

language which actually is

is played by “cube”, “column”, “slab”. And one can say also that “c” denotes this number and not that, – when this is to explain, say, that the letters are to be used in the order “a”, “b”, “c”, “d” etc., and not “a”, “b”, “d”, “c”.
But because you by assimilat[e|ing] in this way the descriptionˇs of the uses of these words to one another, their uses doesn't

become
grow

more similar[:| .] For, as we have seen, their uses is are of widely different sorts.

Think of the tools in a tool chest:

It has
There is

a hammer, a pair of pincers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a pot of glue, glue, nails and screws. – ˇAs [d|D]ifferent as the functions of these objects are, just as different are the functions of words. (And there are similarities in the one case and in the other.)

What confuses us, of course,ch is the uniformity of their appearance when the we hear the words are spoken to us or when we meet them in writing or see them written or in print. For their

use
application

isn't so clearly there

before our eyes
u

. Especially not

when
if

we are

doing philosophy
philosophizing

It is like As when we look looking into the driver's cabin of a locomotive: we see handles

which
that

all look more or less alike. (That's is understandable natural, since they are all

made
supposed

to be

held
grasped

with the ha[d|n]d.) ˇBut [O|o]ne is the crank valve that can be moved ˇregulated by continuously over degrees (it regulates the opening of an air valve); the an other is the handle of a switch, which has only two ˇeffective positions, in which it is effective it's either shut or open; a third is the handle of a brake lever, the

harder
more strongly

you pull it the more strongly the brake is applied; a fourth, the handle of a pump, works only as long as it is

it is moved back and forth.

If we say: “every word of the language denotes something”, – then, so far, ˇwe've said nothing at allchch has been said[;| ,] ˇthat is, unless we explain precisely whatch distinction we w[a|i]sh to make. (It might be that we

wished
wanted

to distinguish the words of ˇour language (

11
9

) from “nonsense” “words ˇ‘without meaning’ which such as oc[u|c]ur in Lewis Caroll's poems.)

Suppose someone said, : “All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the

shape
form

of the board, etc..” – And what is modified by the ruler, the glue pot, the nails? // And what's does does the ruler modify, or the glue pot, or the nails? – “Our knowledge of the length of

a
the

thing, the temperature of the glue and the firmness of the

box
chest

.” – Would anything be aained by this assimilation under one of our expressions? –

The word “

name
denote

” ˇThe expression “the name of an object” is

very straightforwardly
probably best

applied where the sign mark name is actually ˇa mark on the object

itself
which it denotes

.
Suppose then that there are

marks
signs

scratched on the tools which A uses in building.

If
Whench

A shows his assistant a

character
sign

of this sort, then the assistant brings the tool which bears that sign. [(| // ]mark, character // .
In this and in more or less similar ways a name denotes a thing, and a name is given to a thing. (Of this more later.) – It will often proved useful if we say to ourselves in doing philosophy: Naming something, that is something like

attaching a lable to
hanging a name plate on

a thing. –

What about the colour-samples that A shows to B, – do they belong to the language? As you like. They don't belong to

our spoken
the verbal

language; but if I say to someone, “Pronounce the word

the word ‘

the
that

‘”, you will count call the second “the” also as part [f|o]f the sentence. Yet it plays a very similar role to that of a coloured

bit of paper
square

in ˇthe language game ([9|11]): it is a sam[le|pl]e of what the other person is supposed to say, just as the coloured square is a sample of what B is supposed to bring.
It is the most natural thing and it causes the least confusion if we

count
reckon

the samples among the instruments of the language.

We may say that in language ([9|11]) we have various parts of speech. For the functions of “slab” and “cube” are more alike than the functions of “slab” and “d”. But

the way
how

we c[al|la]ssify the words together as various parts of speech will depend on the purpose of the classification, and on our inclination.
Think of the different points of view

according to
from

which one mi[h|g]ht classify tool[d|s] as different kinds of tools. Or chess pieces as different kinds of pieces.

Don't let it bother you that the languages ([3|4]) and ([9|11]) consist only of commands. If you are inclined to say that they are theref[l|o]re incomplete, then ask yourself whether our language is complete; whether it was complete before the symbolism of chemistry and the infini[s|t]esimal calculus were embodied in it: for these are,

as it were
so to speak

, suburbs of our language. (And with how many houses or streets does a

town
city

begin to be a

town
city

We
One

can regard ou[t|r] language as an onld

ancient
old

town
city

, a quarter ˇthe center a maze of narrow alleys and squares, old and new houses, & houses with additions from various periods; and all this surrounded by a mass of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.

houses.
One can easily imagine a language which consist[e|s]d only of commands and

dispatches
announcements

ˇreports in battle. – Or a language which consist[e|s]d only of questions and an expression of affirmation and of denial[.|–] [A|a]nd countless othersˇ things. – And to imagine a language means to imagine a way of living.

But let's see: is the

call
cry

“slab!” in example ([3|4]) a sentence or a word? – If it's a word, then surely it hasn't anyway the same meaning as the word

“slab”
that's pronounced the same

in our ordinary language, for in ˇour language ([3|4]) it is a

call
cry

; but if it's a sentence, then surely it isn't the elliptical sentence “slab!” of our language. ‒ ‒ ‒ As regards the first question

:
,

you can call “slab!” a word, and you can also call it a sentence; perhaps

best
fittingly

a “degenerate sentence” [,| (]as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola). And it is precisely our “elliptical” sentence. ‒ ‒ ‒ But that is surely just isn't this a shortened form of the sentence, “Bring me a slab”[,|?] [a|A]nd there isn't any s[c|u]ch a sentenc sentence in

the language
example

([3|4]). – But why should[I|n't] not I rather call the sentence “Bring me a slab” a lengthening of the sentence “slab!”[,|?] ‒ ‒ ‒ Because the person who calls out “slab!” really means “Bring me a slab!”. ‒ ‒ ‒ But how do you do th[at|is], meaning this while you say “slab”? Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should I, in order to say what you mean by the

call
cry

“slab!”, translate this expression into another? And if they mean the same, – why shouldn't I say: “When you say ‘slab!’ you mean ‘slab!’”? – Or: Why shouldn't it be possible for you to mean “slab!”, if you can mean “Bring me the slab”? ‒ ‒ ‒ But when I shout “slab!”, then surely what I want is

want is that he

shall
shall

bring me a slab. ‒ ‒ ‒ Certainly, but does “wanting this” consist in the fact that youˇ, in some way, think in any form a different sentence from the one you speak? –

“Well [b|B]ut if someone says ‘Bring me a slab’ it looks now as though he could mean this expression as one long word, – corresponding

that is
namely

to the word one word ‘slab!’.” – Can one mean it sometimes as one word and sometimes as four words? And how does one generally mean it? – I

think
believe

that what we shall be inclined to say: is that we mean the sentence as a sentence of four words when we are using it as contrasted with sentences

like
such as

, “Hand me a slab”, “Bring him a slab”, “Bring two slabs”, etc.: as contrasted, that is, with sentences which contain the words of our command in

other
differentch

combinations. – But what does using one sentence as in contrasted with to other sentences consist in? Does one have these ˇother sentences in mind at the time? And all of them? And while one is speaking the sentence, or before or afterwards? – No. Even if such an explanation has some attraction for us, we have only to

consider
think

f[r|o]r a moment what actually happens in order to see that we are on

a wrong track
the wrong road here

. We say we use th[at|is] command as in contrasted with to other sentences because our language contains the possibility of these other sentences. // because in our language these other sentences are possible. Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner who had frequently heard someone giving the command “Bring me the slab”, might suppose that this entire series of sounds was one word and corresponded, say, to the word “building

block
stone

” in his language. If he had then to give this command himself, [w|h]e would perhaps pronounce it differently and we

we should say: He pronounces thi it so

queerly
curiously

because he takes thinks it to be is one word. – But then doesn't

something
anything

different happen in him when he u[e|t]ters

it
this sentence

, corresponding to the fact that he takes views regards the sentences to be as one word? The same thing may happen in him, or again something different may. What happens in you when you give a command of that sort? Are you conscious that it consists of four words while you are uttering it? Of course, you

know
have a mastery of

this language, – in which there are those other sentences also, – but is this

knowing
mastery

something that happens while you are uttering the sentence? – And I have admitted, ˇthat the foreigner

who views the sentence differently will probably also pronounce it differently,
will probably give the sentence he views differently a different pronounciation;

but what we call

his
the

wrong

idea
view

doesn't

necessarily
have to lie

in anything that accompanies the uttering of the command. (Of th[at|is] m[l|o]re later.)

The sentence is not ‘elliptical’ because it

omit
leaves out

something

that
which

think
mean

when we utter it, but because it is

abbreviated,
shortened

in as compar[is|ed]onch with a particular standard of our grammar. – One might here make the obje[t|c]tion: “You admit that the

abbreviated
shortened

and the

unabbreviated
unshortened

sentence have the same meaning. – Well, [W|w]hat meaning have they then? ? Is Isn't there not

an
one verbal

ex[r|p]ression for this meaning?” – But doesn't

their
the

identical meaning of the sentences consist in their having the same

use
application

? (In Russian they say “stone red” inste[da|ad] of “the stone is red”;

don't they get the full meaning, as they leave out the copula
is the copula left out of the meaning for them

? or do they think

it
the copula

to themselvesˇ without pronouncing it? –)

One can easily also imagine a language also in which B, in reply to a question by A, informs him of ˇhas to report to him the number of slabs or cubes

cubes ◇◇◇ ˇstacked up in some place; or the colours

or shapes
and forms

certain
the

building-stonesblocks. that lie in one pla[v|c]e and another.
The purport of such a report might then be: “five slabs.”. Such a report might

be of the form
then say

: “five slabs.”. Now what is the difference between the report, or assertionch, “five slabs.”, and the command “five slabs!”? –

It is
Well,

the role which

saying
the utterance of

these words plays in

our
the

language games. But ˇprobably the tone o[v|f] vioce in which they are uttered will probably be different

too
as well

, and the facial expression and various other things. But

it may well be
we can also imagine

that the tone of voice is the same ˇin both cases – for a command and a report

may
can

be uttered in

a lot of
various

different tones of voice and with

a lot of different
various

facial expressions – and that the difference ˇmay lies ˇonly in the application alone what is done with the words “five slabs”. – (Of course we might also use the words “assertion” and “command” ˇjust to indicate a grammatical

form
combination

of a sentence or and a word ˇparticular intonation, just as one ˇwould calls the sentence, “Isn't it glorious weather today?”, a question, even although it is used like as an assertion.) We could imagine a language in which all assertions had the form and the intonation of a rhetorical question; or ˇin which every command ˇhad the form: “Would you like to

…
do that

?”. One

might
would then

perhaps sayˇ in this case: “What he says has the form of a question but ˇit is really a command”, i.e. has the function of a command in the practical employment of language. . (Similarly one says “you will do that ˇso & so” not as a prophecy but as a command. What ˇwould makes it the oneand , what the other?)

Frege's view that in an assertion there is contain[e|s]d a supposal Annahme, and that it is this

which
that

is asserted, is based really on the possibility that there is in our language o[r|f] writing every

every assertion sentence in the form: “It is asserted that so and so is the case”. But “that so and so is the case” is not a sentence in our language –

this
it

is not ˇyet a move in our language game. And if I write insetad of “It is asserted that …”, ˇI write “It is asserted: so and so is the case”, then in this case the words “It is asserted” are quite superfluous.
We might very well write every assertion in the form of a question followed by an affirmative reply; thus instead of “It's is raining”, “Is it raining? Yes.”. Would that show that in eve[er|ry] assertion there is contained a question?

Of course one has a right to use a mark of an asserion ˇsign in contrast, for instance, to a question mark. The mistake is only [in|to] thinking that the assertion now consists

of
in

two acts, the consider[ati|ing]in and the asserti[on|ng] (assigning the truth value, or

whatever you call it
something of that sort

), and that we perform these acts according to the signs [in| of] the sentence,

almost
rather

as we sing from notes. We might certainly What can be compared ˇto with the singing from notes is the reading aloudly, or softly silently, according to the written to oneself, of the signs of the sentence with singing from notes,; but not “ˇthe meaning” (ˇ◇the thinking) ˇof the sentence that is read.

The important sense of point about of Frege's mark of assertion ˇsign is put perhaps ˇput best if we by say[:|in]g: it indicates clearly the beginning of the sentence. – Th[at|is] is important:

for
because

our phi[s|l]osophical difficulties concerning the nature of [“| ‘]negation[”| ’] and of [“| ‘]thinking[”| ’], originate spring in a sense, from ˇare due to the fact that we don't see ˇrealise that an sentence assertion “⊢ not p”, or “⊢ I believe p”, and the

assertion
sentence

“⊢ p” have “p” in common, but not “⊢ p”. (For if I hear someone say, the words “it's raining”, then I don't know what he has said if I don't know

know whether I I have heard the beginning of the sentence.)

But [H|h]ow many kinds of sentence are there, though? ˇIs it [A|a]ssertion[,|s], questions and commands perhaps? – There are innumerable kinds: innumerable different kinds of use applications of

all
everything

that we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this variety is nothing ˇthat is fixed, given once and for all, but new types of language, new language games – as we may say –

come into being
spring up

and others

become
grew

obsolete and are forgotten. (We can get [a|A] rough picture of this ˇwe ˇcan get if we look at from the

transformation
changes

in which happen in mathematicsˇ seeing.)
The expression “language game” is supposed used here to emphasise here that the speaking of the [,|l]anguage is part of an activity,

part
or

of a way of living. of human beings.
      Bring the ˇTo get an idea of the enormous variety of the language games before your mind by consider these these and other examp[,|l]es,ˇ & others:
       giving [C|c]ommandsch commanding, and acting according to commands;
       giving a describ[ing|tion] ˇof an object acco[dr|rd]ing to its appearance by describing what it look like, or according to by giving it's measurements;
       producing an object according to a description (drawing);
       reporting an course of events;

making
setting up

a hypothesis and testing it;
present[ati|ing]on of the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams;

acting a play
performing in a theatre

;
singing a catch;
guessing asking riddles; & guessing them;

riddles;
       making a joke, or telling one;
       solving an example problem in applied arithmetic;
       translating from one language into another;

requesting
entreating

, thanking, swearing, greeting, praying.
– It is interesting to compare the variety of the instruments of our language and of their applicat ways they are applied their various uses – the variety of the parts of speech and of the kinds of ˇwords & of sentences – with what logicians have said about the structure of ˇour language. (And ˇIncluding the author of the Tract.atus Log.ico-phil.osophicus as well.)

If we don't see that there is a multitude of language games, we are inclined to ask: “What is a question?” Is it the statement that I don't know so and so, or ˇis it the statement that I wish the other person would tell me …? Or is it the description [f|o]f my mental state of uncertainty? – And is the cry “help!” ˇsuch a description? of that sort?
Think of what widely different things we call “description[”|s]”: the description of the position of a body by means of its coordinates: the description of

changes in
the course of

a sensation of pain.
One can [O|o]f course put instead of one can replace the usual form of the a question ˇby that of

a
the

statement or ˇa description: ˇsuch as “I want to know whether …”, or “I am in doubt as to [h|w]hether …” – but one hasn't thereby brought the different language games any nearer to one another.
The s[u|i]gnificance of such this possibilit[i|y]es of transforming, for instance, all

assertions
declarative sentences

into sentences that begin

begin with the

words
clause

“I think” or “I believe” (i.e. so to speak into descriptions of my

mental states
inner life

) will appear later.

It is sometimes said: animals don't speak, because they

lack
haven't

the ˇnecessary intellectual capacities. And this means: ‘they don't think, therefore they don't speak’. But the fact is that they just don't speak. Or

rather
t

: they don't use language. (If we disregard except the most primitive forms of language.)

Giving orders
Commanding

, askingˇ questions,

describing
recounting

, prattling, belong to our natural history just as walking, eating, drinking, playing do. (It makes no difference here whether the speaking is ˇdone with the mouth or ˇdone with the hand.)

This is connected with the view fact that ˇwe think that the the learning of the language consists in naming objects;

viz.
namely

human beings,

shapes
forms

, colours,

aches
pains

, moods, numbers, etc..– As we have said, – naming is something like affixing a nameplate to

putting
ˇfastening

a label to a thing. ˇAnd this [O|o]ne may might call this the a preparation for the use of a word. But for what is it a preparation?

       “We name things and can now ˇwe can talk about them[.|;] We can refer to them in what we say.” – As though with the act of nam[k|i]ng we had ˇall that happens after it were already at hand fixed what we go on to do afterwards. As though there were only one thing that is called “speaking about things”. Whereas actually we do things of the most widely different kinds ˇof things with our sentences. Think only of the int[r|e]rjections. – [W|w]ith their entirely utterly very different functions.
                        Water!
                        Away! // Get out!
                        [I|O]uch!
                        Help!

Help!
Beautiful! // Lovely!
No!
Are you still inclined to call these words “giving “names [to|of] objects”?

In t[e|h]e languages ([3|4]) and ([9|11]) there was no such thing as asking what someathing is called. This and its correlate, the ostensive explanation, definition, is, we might say, a separate language game. That means really: we are

taught
brought up

, trained, to asked “What is th[at|is] called?”, – and then the nam[i|e]ng follows is given. ˇAnd [T|t]here is also a language gameof : inventing a name for something.

I.e., to say
That is, of saying

, “Th[at's|is is] called …” and then

to use
using

the new name. (In this way,

e.g.
for instance

, children name their dolls and [g|t]hen go on to talk about them. In this connection consider at the same time how what a ˇvery special use ˇwe make of a personal name: it is when we use it to call someone.) // … how speci[l|a]l that use of a personal name is with which we call the person named.) //
Now you we can give an ostensiv[e|ly] defin[i|e]nition a personal name, a colour word, [a| the] name of a material, a numeral, the name of a direction // the name [f|o]f a point of the compass // , etc., etc.. The defin[t|i]tion of two: “Th[at|is] is called ‘two’” – pointin[t|g] to two nuts – is perfectly exact. – But how can you define “two” in th[at|is] way? The person to whom you are giv[i|e]ng the definition

won't
doesn't

know then what ˇit is you w[ant|ish] to call “two”; he'll suppose that you are have call[in|ed]g this group of nuts “two”. – He may suppose this, – but perhaps he won't suppose it. . He might also do just the opposite: when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts he might take this

to be
for

the name

name of a number. And equally, if I give an ostensive definition of a personal name, he might take

it
this

to be the name of a colour, the name of a race, even the name of a direction ˇpoint of the compass. That is, the ostensive de[r|f]inition can in every cases be interpreted in one this way or and also in others. in that way.

You may say: “Two” can be defin[t|e]d ostensively only in thisch way: “This number is called ‘two’”[,|.] [f|F]or the word “number” shows here in what place in the our language – in the our grammar – we set ˇput assign to the word; but this means that the word “number” must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. – The word “number” in the definition does

indeed
certainly

indicate this place, – the post to which we assign ˇto the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings in this way, by saying, “This colour is called so and so”, “This length is called so and so”, etc.. That is: misunderstandings are often avoided in this way. But can the word “colour”, then, or “length”, be understood [i|o]nly in this way? – Well, we'll ˇshall have to explain them. ˇThat is[–|,] [E|e]xplain them by ˇmeans of other words, that is! And what about the last explanation in this chain? (Don't say: “There isn't any ‘last’ explanation”;. [t|T]h[at|is] is exactly as though you were to sa[y|id], “There isn't any last house in this street: you can always build ˇanother one further”.) .”)
Whether the word “number” ˇis necessary in the ostensive definition of “two” is necessary depends on ˇupon whether he understands this word differently takes this word in a different sense from the way I wish him to the one I wish ˇmisunderstands my definition if I leave out the word. And th[at|is] will depend on the circumstances under which I give it the definition is given and on the person to whom I give it.

give it.
And how he “understands” the explanation ˇwill appears in how the way he makes use of th[w|e] word explained.

One might say then: The ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of the word if it is already clear in general what ˇkind of role the word is to play in the language. Thus if I know that someone wants to explain a colour word to me, then the explanation “Th[at'|is i]s called ‘sepia’” will help make me to get an understanding of the word. – And you can say this

as long as you remember
if you don't forget

that there are all sorts of questions connected with now attach to the words “ˇto know”

and
or

“be clear”.
You have to know something already

before you can ◇
in order to be able to

ask what it ˇsomething is called. But what do you have to know?
If you show someone the king in a ˇset of chess game ˇmen and say, “Th[at|is] is the king of chess”, you do not thereby explain to him the use of this piece, – unless he already knows the rules of the game except for this last point: the

shape
form

of the king-piece.. We can imagine that he has learned the rules of the game without ever having been shown a real chessman. The

shape
form

a
the

chessman corresponds here to the sound or the shape of a word.
But we can also imagine someone's having lea[v|r]ned the game without ever having learned or formulated [v|r]ules. He has perhaps first learned very simple games on boards by watching them and has proceeded to more and more complicated ones. To him also you might give the explanation, “Th[at|is] is the king”, if, for instance, you are showing him chess

men
pieces

of an unusual

shape
form

. And this explanation teaches him the use of the

piece
figure

only because, as we

we might say,

we had in the game already prepared the place in which it was
the place in which it was put was already prepared.

Or again: We shall say the explanation teaches him the use, only when the pla[v|c]e is has already ˇbeen prepared. And it is so here ˇprepared in this case not because the per[os|so]n to whom we are giving the explanation already knows rules, but because he [a|h]as ˇin a different sense, already mastered the a game. in a different sense.
Consider still another case: I explain the game of chess to someone and begin by showing him a pieceand , saying, “Th[at|is] is the king”. – [He| It] can move in this and this way, etc. etc.”. – In this case we shall say: the words “Th[at|is] is the king” (or, “Th[at|is] is called ‘king’”)

explain the use
are an explanation

of the words ˇ“the king”, only if the person

we teach
learning

already “knows what a piece in a game is”: when he has already played other games, say, or “has watched the play ‘with unders[a|t]anding[”|’] ˇgames played by other people, and

the like
so forth

. And only then will he be

in a position
able

to ask relevantly, in learning the game, “What's th[at|is] called?” –

that is
namely

, this piece.
We may say: it is sensible for there is only sense in someone's to asking what ˇfor the name is only if he knows already what to dow with it. the name.
For [W|w]e can imagine also that the person who is we I have asked, answers, “decide on the give it the a name yourself”, – and then the person whoˇever asked the question I whshould have to make himself responsible for everything catch on to provide everything himmyself.

Anyone who comes into a foreign

country
land

will often have
has frequently

to learn the language [f|o]f the inhabitants there

by
through

ostensive

explanations
definitions

which

people
they

give him; and he

will often have
has frequently

to guess the interpretation of these explanations, ˇ& will guess it

sometimes
often

correctly,

sometimes
often

wrong[.|ly.]
And now we can say, I think:

And now we can say, I think: Augustine describes

the child's
the

learning of h[i|u]man of language to speak as though the child

had come
came

to a foreign country and did not without understanding

it's
the country's

language; that is, as though the child already had a language, only not this one. Or, as though the child could already think but could not speak yet. And here “think” ˇwould means something like: speak to onehimself.

But what if someone objected, : “It is_n[o|']t true that someone you must ˇalready have mastered a language game already in order to understand an ostensive definition, butch only he's has only – obviously – ˇof course, you've got to know (or guess) what the person explaining ˇman who gives the explanation is pointing to[.|:] ˇe.g., [W|w]hether, for instance, to the

shape
form

the
an

object, or to its co[,|l]our, or to the number ˇof ˇthe objects, [t|e]tc., etc..” – And what does “pointing to the

shape
form

”, “pointing to the colour” etc. consist in, then? Point to a piece of paper. – And now point to its

shape
form

, – now to its colour, – now to its number (that sounds queer). – Well, how did you do it? – You will say you “meant” something different each time you pointed. And if I ask you how that takes place this is done ˇyou do this, you will say you directed concentrated your attention on the colour, on the

shape
form

etc.. But

now
then

I ask again how th[at|is]

is done.
takes place.

Suppose someone points to a vase and says, “Look at th[at|is]

gorgeous
glorious

marvelous blue! – the shape doesn't matter.” – Or, “Look at th[e|is]

wonderful
magnificent

shape! – the colour'' is unimportant.” – Undoubtedly y[p|o]u will do ˇsomething different things in each case if you

do what he asks you
comply with both these requests

. But do you always do the same ˇthing when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various cases –

e.g. these: –
I will suggest some:

“Is this blue the same as that? Do you see a

see a difference?” –
You are mixing

paints on a palette
colours

and you say, “This blue of the sky is hard to

◇◇◇ get
find

.”
                     “It[s|']s going to be fine, you can see the blue sky already again.”
                     “Look what different effects these two blues give.”
                     “Do you see th[e|at] blue book over there? Please

fetch
bring

it.”
“This blue signal light means …”
“What'[i|s]s this blue called? – is it “indigo”–?”
Directing the attention to the colour sometimes means shutting out the outlines of

a
the

shape with

your
one's

hand, or, not ˇlooking direct[in|ly]g one's gaze at the contour of the thing; sometimes ˇit means starring at the thing and trying to remember where one has seen this colour before. You direct your attention to the ˇshape of a thing, sometimes by

drawing
sketching

it, sometimes by

half closing the eyes
squinting

ˇscrewing up the eyes so as not to see the colour clearly, etc., etc.. I

wish
want

to sayˇ that: this and things like it is the sort of thing that happens while one you [“|‘]directs the one's your attention to

something’
this and that”

. But th[at|is] is not the only thing that allows it isn't just this which makes us to say, ˇ that someone is directing his attention to the shape, to the colour, etc.. Juts as “making a move in chess” does_n[o|']t ˇonly consist in the fact that pushing a piece is from pushed accross the board in such and such a way here to there –

nor
but also not

in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move in the person making it – but rather in the circumstances that we call “

playing
taking part in

game of chess
chess game

”, or “solving a chess problem”, and

the like
so forth

But suppose someone sa[ys|id], : “I always do the same thing when I direct my attention to

a
the

shape: I [h|f]ollow the

outline
contour

with my

my eyes and with the feeling [ …| …]”. And suppose this person gives to someone else the ostensive

explanation
definitionch

, “Th[at|is] is called ˇa ‘circle’”, by pointing, with all these experiences, to a circular object ˇ& having all these experiences[:|.] – [c|C]an't the other person still interpret this explanation differently, even although he sees that the person giving

it
the explanation

follows the shape with his eyesand , even

if
though

he feels what the person giving the explanation feels? That

is to say
is

, this “interp[e|r]etation”

may
can also

consist in the way in use which he makes now uses makes of the word,

e.g.
for instance

what he in his point[s|i]ng to when he is ˇsuch & such an object when given the command, : “Point to a circle”. – For neither the expression, “meaning the explanation in such and such a way”, nor the expression, “interpreting the explanation in such and such a way”, indicates a

particular
definite

process which accompan[ies|ying] the giving and

receiving
hearing

of the explanation.

There are

indeed
certainly

what one can we may ˇmight be called “characteristic experiences” ofor pointing ˇ(e.g.) to the a shape , e.g. (for instance). For example instance, [t|T]racing the contour outline with one's fingerˇ, for instance, or with one's

eyes
gaze

, in pointing. – But just as little as just as thisch ˇdoesn't happens in all cases in which I [“|‘]mean the shape[”|’], – equally – similarly little is it true that there isn't any no other characteristic process ˇeither occur[[s|ing]|s] in all these cases. But

even
also,

if something of the sort such process did [re|oc]cur in all of them, it would still de[e|p]end

upon
on

the circumstances – i.e. upon what happened befo[e|r]e and after the pointing – whether we L[sh|w]ould say, : “He pointed to the shape and n[t|o]t to the colour”.
For the

expressions
words

“pointing to the shape”, “meaning the shape” etc. are not used like these as

these others
these

are like these:– “pointing to the book”, “pointing to the letter ‘B’ and not to the letter ‘u’” etc.. – For Just think only of how differently we learn the use of the

expressions
words

: “pointing to

to this thing”, “pointing to that thing”, and on the other hand “pointing to the colour and not to the shape”, “meaning the colour”, etc., etc..
As I say ˇAs I have said, in certain cases, particularly in pointing [“|‘]to the shape[”|’], or [“|‘]to the number[”|’], there are characteristic exp[r|e]riences and ways of pointing, – “characteristic” because they frequently, (not [wa|al]ways[,|)] [re|oc]cur where shape or number is “meant”. But do you also know a characteristic experience for pointing to a figure piece in a game chessman as piece in a game a chessman? – And yet

you
one

may say, : “I mean this

chessman
piece in the game

is called ‘king’, not this particular

block
piece

[f|o]f wood that I'm pointing to.”
And we do here, what we do in

a host of
1000

similar cases:

as
Because

aren't able to
can't

mention ˇpoint out some one bodily action

which
that

we call “pointing to the shape” (as opposed, e.g., to the colour) we say ˇthat a mental activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language leads us to expect a body ˇlook for a physical thing, and there isn't any

thing
body

; there
, there,

we are inclined to say, is a mind. put a spirit.

“What is the relation between names and

the named
what they name

?” [)| –] Well, what is it? Look at ˇthe our lang[au|ua]ge game ([3|4]), or ˇat some otherˇ language game; you can that's where you'll see there what this relation consists in. This this relation may, [a|A]mong various other things, consist also in the fact that hearing the name calls up an image of the thing named in our minds,, and it ˇsometimes consists among other things also in the fact that the name is written on the thing named, or that

the name
it

is it uttered when the thing named is pointed t[l|o].
But what does is the word “this” ˇa name ˇof in ˇthe language game (9), or

or the word “that” in the ostensive explanation “th[at|is] is called …”? Well, if you don't want to

give rise to
introduce

ˇproduce confusion it is best not to say that these words name anything. – And, curiously enough, it was once said of the word “this” that it is the real name. Ever[e|y]thing else that we call “name” is so ˇbeing a name only in an inexact, appro[c|x]imate sense.
This curious view has its origin in a tendency to sublimate – as we might call it – the logic of our language. The proper answer to it is: [W|w]e call widely different things “names”; the word “name” character[s|i]ses many different sort[f|s]s kinds of uses of a word[,|s], related to one another each in many different ways; – but among these kinds of uses is not that of the word “this”.
It is true that we often,

e.g.
for instance

in ˇgiving an ostensi[c|v]e defi[t|n]i[o|t]ion, point to

a
the

thing named and in doing so pronounce

it's
the

name. And similarly we pronounce

–
,

e.g.
for instance

in an ostensive definition

–
,

the word “this” as we in pointing to

a
the

thing. And the word “this” and a name ˇcan often

stand in the same context
have the same syntax

: we say “Fetch this”, and also “Fetch Paul”. – But it is precisely one of the characteristic features of a name that

it
its meaning

This is connected with the

idea
view

of naming as, so to speak, an occult processˇ, as it were. The [n|N]aming appears as seems seems to us like ˇto be a strange connection of between a word with the and an object. –

a word

and an
with the

object. – And

a
this

strange connection does really take place is made

–
,

namely when the philosopher, in order to

see
bring out

what thech connection is between a name and

a
the

thing named, stares an an object before him, and at the same time repeat[s|ing] a name – or it maye be the word “this” – over and over again. For thech philosophical problems arise when language id[e|l]es. And then ˇindeed we may its easy to even imagine well enough that naming is some

queer
remarkable

mental act, as it were a kind of christeningˇ, as it were, of the object. And similarly we may then also say the w[r|o]rd “this” as it were to the object, addressˇing it

–
,

a/strange use of this word, that probably occurs which, I thinkm is never is made only when we are outside doing engaged in [P|p]hilosoph[[y|i]|y][. –|sing]. –

But what gives people the idea of wanting to make why should one wish to regard just this word ˇas a name, when it so obviously isn't a name? –

For this very reason
Just that

; for th[y|e]y we are inclined to make an raise an objectionion to ˇcalling “ˇa name” what is generally called “name” so; and th[e|is] objection can be

expressed by saying
put in this way

: that the name really ought to

stand for
indicate

something simple. And for this one can might give say the following reasons be defended as follows:– A proper name in the ordinary sense

is
would be

e.g.
for instance

, the word “Noth[i|u]ng ˇEscaliber”. The sword Nothung consistsed of ˇvarious parts put together in a

certain
particular

way. If they are not put together differently in a different this way then Nothung doesn't exist. Now the sentence “Nothung has a sharp edge” obviously has

sense
meaning

, whether Nothung is still whole or has been smashed to bits. Yet if “Nothung” is the name of an object, then this object doesn't exist any more when Nothung has been smashed; and since the name wouldn't then ha[v|s]e any no object corresponding to it then, it wouldn't have hasn't any meaning. But then in the sentence, “Nothung has a sha[p|r]p edge”, there

is
would be

a word

without a
that has no

meaning, and so ˇtherefore

“Nothung has a sharp edge”
the sentence

would be

would be nonsense. But ˇto say th[e|is] sentence does have meaning, and so ˇto the words of which it consists must alwaysch correspond to something.

Therefore
So that

an
the

analysis of the meaning ˇsense ◇◇◇ the word “Nothung” must disappear, and

instead of it
in its place

must come words ˇmust appear that name which stand for ˇdenote something simpleˇ objects. And [t|T]hese words we may reasonably call the real names.

Let us ˇfirst of all discuss one this point of this the argument first of all: namely that the word has no meaning when nothing corresponds to it. – It is important to

note
state

that the word “meaning” is used ungrammatically if one when use[s|d] it to indicate the thing which [“|‘]corresponds[”|’] to the wordˇ ‘stands for’. This

is
amounts to

confusing the meaning of the name with the bearer of the name. If Paul

is dead,
dies,

then we say the bearer of the name is dead, but

we don't say
no one says

the meaning of the name is dead. And it would be nonsensicaleical to speak that way say such a thing ˇthis, for if the name ˇhad ceased to have meaning, then it wou[,|l]d have no meaning to say, “Paul

is dead
has died

”.

In (1[3|9]) we introduced proper names into ˇour language ([9|11]). Now suppose the tool with the name (α) is were had been bro[p|k]en. A doesn't know this, and gives B the sign (α): has this sign ˇa meaning now, or

hasn't it
has it none

? – What'sis B supposed to do when he receives this sign? – We have made no agreement about this. You might ask, what will he do? Well, perhaps he will stand there perplexed, or show A the pieces. You might say here, : (α) has become meaningl[l|e]ss; and this expression would indicate that there is now no further use for the sign (α) in o[r|u]r language game (unless we (were to) give it a new one). (α)

may
might

also become meaningless

if
through the fact that

we, for any some reason whatever or other, ˇwe scratched a different mark sign mark on the tool and didn't no longer use the sign (α) in the game any more. – But we can also imagine

imagine an agreement accord[n|i]ng to which, when a tool is broken and A gives ˇshows B the sign of this tool, B has to shake his head as an answer to him. – This gives, we might say, ˇgives the command (α) a place in the language game, even

if
when

the
this

tool no longer exists. And we can now ˇwe may say that the sign (α) has a meaning even when its bearer has cease[s|d] to exist.

We may [f|F]or We may – for a large class of cases in which the word “meaning” is used– , though not for all cases of its use, – explain this word thus: Tthe meaning of a word is its use in the language.
And we

sometimes
often

explain the meaning of a name by pointing to the it's bearer. of it.

“But, in that game, do names ˇsigns that ˇhave meaning also which have never been used for a tool have meaning as well too?” Let's suppose that “X” is such a sign

sign
mark

and A

shows
gives

it
this sign

to B. – Well, [s|S]uch a signs – Signs of this sort might may ˇalso be included embodied in the our language game, and B might be supposed, expected say, to answer it them also by shaking his head. One

may
might

ˇe.g. imagine this as ˇto be a way the two of them had of [i|a]musing themselves. of making their work more pleasant.

We said that the sentence, “Nothung has a sharp edge”, has

sense
meaning

even

when
if

Nothung has already been broken to pieces. Now th[at|is] is so because in this language game a name is also used in the absence of its bearer. Butw we can imagine a language game with names (

that is,
i.e.

[i|w]ith signs

which
that

we should certainly also call “names”) in which names are used only in the presence of their bearers. Suppose, say, [f|t]hat we were watching a surface on which coloured spots were are mov[i|e]ng ˇabout (as on the screen

in
of

a cinema). There are three such spots, which slowly change their shapes and positions. Suppose I ha[d|ve] named them “P”, “Q” and “R” by giving os[e|t]ensive definitions. Our

Our language describes the changes of these three, and

we use
I say to you

sentences like, : “Do you see how P is contracting now and is approaching R?”. – Now in this language

the
these

names are supposed to be used as synonyms for the demonstrative pronoun “this” together with (the plus pointing to a coloured spot). ˇThus [i|I]f one of the three spots disappears, then I may can't say “P has disappeared” – any more than I should say “this has disappeared” – but we ˇmight say rather, “[T|t]he letter ‘[p|P]’ drops is out of use”.
In this language

you
we

can
maych

say, a name loses its meaning

when
if

its bearer ceases to exist, and the ˇthere is something words signs words ˇwhich corresponds to the words “P”, “Q” and “R” always have something corresponding to them as long as they have any meaning – use in the/language game – at all. (For in the sentence, “‘P’ drops is out⌊”⌋ of use, the sign ““‘P’”” occurs, but not “P”; and I assume that we do'_n[o|']t speak about past

events
occurrences

or else
or

use
here

another some mode of expression

for them
for it

.) In this language game, then, a name canno't cease to have a bearer; only this isn't any advantage asset of the language game[,| ;] for even when it hasn't a bearer a name may can have a purpose, use, i.e. meaningˇ without having a bearer. (ˇAnd [T|t]hus, ˇe.g., the name “Odysseus” has meaning.) for instance.)

But

this
our

language game can, I think, show us a reason why one

might wish
may want

to make ˇsay that the demonstrative pronoun ˇis a name: for the demonstrative “this” can never be without a meaning bearer. One might say, : “So long as there is a this, then the word [‘|‘]this’ has meaning, no matter whether this is simple o[f|r] complex.” – But

this
in fact that

does not make it a name. On the contrary, – for we don't use a name by making isn't used with a deomnstrative gesture, but only explained it by it.

What is the position with regard to whether names really Now what about this matter of names

really standing for

something
what is

simple? –
Socrates (in the Theaetetus):

These primary elements were are a[sl|ls]o what Russell's “individuals” were, and my “objects” (Tractatus Logico-philosophicus).

But what are the simple

elements
components

[f|o]f which reality is

composed
made◇ up

? – What are the simple

elements
components

of a chair? – The pieces of wood out [f|o]f which it is put together? Or the molecules? [o|O]r the electrons? “Simple” means: not

complex
composite

. And th[en|us] it all depends on: in what sense “

complex
composite

”? It

makes no sense
is senseless

to talk about the “simple components of a chair” without qualification. Or: Does my visual

sense datum
image

the visual appearance I get of th[ei|is] tree, or of this chair, consist of parts? [a|A]nd what are its simple components? Being of different colours is

a
one

kind of complexity; another is,

e.g.
for instance

, the composition of this broken

line
contour

out of straight bits. A[d|n]d you

may
might

call this a say that this curve

a complex compound of was made up of an ascending and a descending

branch
part

.
If I say to someone without further explanation, : “What I now see before me is complex”, then he will be quite correct in rightly asking, you: “What do◇ you mean by ‘complex’? Th[at|is]

may
can

mean all sorts of things.” – The question, “Is what you see complex?”, does have meaning if it is already clear what sort of complexity – i.e., what particular kind of use [f|o]f this word – is supposed to be in question we are referring to is in question. If it ha[s|d] been

laid down
settled

e.g.
for instance

, that the visual

appearance
image

of a tree

is to
shall

be called complex if you see not only a trunk but also branches, then the question, “Is the visual appearance of this tree simple or complex?”, and the question, “What are its simple components?”, would have a clear use ˇsense, a clear use. And the answer to the second questionˇ is, of course, is not,: “[T|t]he branches” (this would be an answer to the grammatical question “What d[l|o]es one call do you call here ‘simple components’ here?”) but rather a description of the individual branches.

But isn'tˇ, say, a chess board, for instance, obviously and w[k|i]thout qualification complex? –

I suppose you're
You are probably

thinking of its being

composed
made up

of 32 wh[a|i]te and 32 black squares; : – but mightn't you sayfor instance also , e.g., that it is made up of the colours [b|w]hite, black and the pattern of

a
the

net of squares? And ˇso, if there are entirely different ways of looking at it, do you still want to say that the chess board is [“|‘]complex[”|’] without qualification? The mistake of asking, outside ˇof a particular game, : “Is this object complex?”, is similar to that which a small boy once made who had

to decide
to say

whether the verbs in this and that such & such sentences was were used in the active or ˇin the passive form, and who then

pondered the question
reflected

ˇnow tried to puzzle out whether for instance the verb “to sleep”ˇ, for instance, meant something active or something passive.
The word “complex” (and so the word “simple”ˇ also) is one that we used ˇby us in innumerable different ways, connected in various ways with one another each. (Is the colour of this square

of
in

the chess board simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is the white simple, or is it

composed
made up

of the colours of the rain_bow? – Is this

line
stretch

of 2 cm simple, or does it consist of two parts stretches of 1 cm each? But why not of a piece ˇof 3 cm, long and a piece of 1 cm added on in a negative sense?)

To the philosophical question, : “Is the visual image of this tree complex, and what are its components?”, the right answer is, : “That depends

upon
on

what you understand by [“|‘]complex’”. (And this, of course, is not answering the question, but rejecting it.)

Let us apply the method of

№
chapter

(3) to the account in the Theaetetus: [L|l]et us consider a language game for which this ˇis the correct account. really holds. Let [T|t]he language then serves to describe combinations of

of coloured

patches
spots

on a surface. The

patches
spots

are squares and

form
make

a complex like a chess board. There are red, green, white and black squares. The words of the language are (correspondingly): “r”, “g”, “w”, “b”, and a sentence is a

row
string

of these words. They describe an arrangement of coloured squares in the order

1	2
3	4

1	2	3
4	5	6
7	8	9

etc..
The sentence “ r r b g g g r w w” describes then, for instance, an arrangement of this sort:

r	r	b
g	g	g
r	w	w

Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which a complex of elements corresponds. The primary elements are the coloured squares: – “but are these simple?” – I can't think of anything don't know [t|w]hat it I [w|c]ould be more naturally to call ˇthe “ˇ◇◇◇simpleˇ elements”, in this language game. In other circumstance circumstances, however, I [sh|w]ould call a coloured square “complex[2|”], – composed, say, of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But the concept of ‘complexity’ might also be extended

in such a way
so

that the smaller surface is said to be “composed” of a larger surface and one subtracted from it. Compare

the
the

under
in

certain circumstances we are inclined to

regard
take

the smaller thing as

the
a

re[l|s]ult of the [“|‘]composition[”|’] of combining what is largerˇ things, and the larger thing as the result of

a
the

division of what is a smaller[.|t]hing
But I don't know whether I should say that the figure which our sentence describes consists of four elements or o[r|f] nine. Well, does

does that sentence consist of four letters of o[r|f] nine? – And what are its elements: the letter types or the letters? And isn't it

all the same
quite indifferent

which we say, if only we avoid misunderstandings? in the particular case??

But what d[e|o]es it mean, that we can't explain (i.e. describe) these elements but only name them? Th[at|is] m[g|i]ght mean, say, that the description of a complex, if this complex consist[e|s]d[,| (]in a limiting case[,|)] of only one element square, is simply the name of the coloured square. // This might mean, say, that when a complex consists, in a limiting case, of only one square, then its description is simply the name of

that
the

coloured square.

One
We

might say here – although this easily leads to all sorts of philosophical supers[i|t]itions – that a sign [

1
2

|“]r”, or “[s|b] b” etc., may sometimes be a word and sometimes a sentence. But whether it [“| ‘]is a word or a sentence[”| ’] depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. If ˇe.g. A has to describe for B complexes [f|o]f coloure[s|d] squares and if he uses here the word “r”

by itself
alone

, then we may say that the word is here a description – a sentence. But if ˇe.g. he ˇis memoris[es|ing], say, the words and their what they meanings, or if he is teaching

someone else
another

the use of the words and utters them in connection with ostensive teaching while giving with the appropriate gesture, then we shall not say that they are sentences here. In this situation the word “r”, for instance, is not a description; you are nam[e|ing] an element◇ with it, : – but it ˇthat's why it would be st[a|r]ange to say on that account here th[t|a]t the element can only be named. Naming and describing, in fact, are not on the same level: naming is a preparation for describing. When you have With In [[n|N]|n]am[ed|ing] something youch we haven' n[o|']t haven't yet made a move in the language game, – an[d|y] more than you' have made a move in

in a chess game by setting a putting a pieceˇ on the board. We may say: with the naming by giving of a thing ˇa name nothingch ha' yet been done. It hasn't even yet a name, – except in the game. Th[at|is] is also what Frege meant by saying that a word has meaning only in

the context of
its connection with

a sentence.

What is meant by saying of the elements that we can ascribe neither being nor not-being to them? –

We
One

might say something like this: If everything that we call being or not-being consists in the fact that connections holding or do or not holding between the elements, then there is no sense in speaking of the being (not-being) o[r|f] an element; just as, if everything that we call “destroying” consists in the separating tearing apart of elemtns elements ap, it has no sense to speak of destroying an element.
But we our we should should like wish to say:

we
you

can't ascribe atribute predicate being to of an element, because if it

didn't exist
were not

, then you it couldn't even name it be named, and so you could say therefore [t|n]othing ˇcould be said of about it. – dLet' us consider an analogous case, though, which will make th[e|is]

thing
matter

clearer[:| .] There is one thing of which you can't say either that it is 1 m long or that it isch not 1 m long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. – But ˇ, of course, we have n[o|']t thereby ascribed by saying this we haven't attributed any peculiar ˇany curious property to the standard meter, of course, but have only indicated its peculiar role in the game process // procedures // of measuring with the meter-rule. – dLet' us

imagine
suppose

samples of colours pre[v|s]er[s|v]ed in Paris in a similar the way to the standard meterˇ is[.|:] Then And ˇand we explain ˇe.g. that “sepia” means the colour of the standard sˇepeia that is preserved there

under
in

a vacuum. Then it will have no se sense to say of this sample either that it has this colour or that it hasn't it.

it.

This may be expressed thus
We may express this in this way

the
This

sample is

an instrument
a part

of the language with ˇby means of which we make statements about colours. ˇIn this game [I|i]t is, in this game, not something ˇwhich is described in this game,, but a means of descri[bing|ption]. – And the same thing holds of an element in ˇthe language game ˇin № ([4|5]7) when, in naming it ˇassigning a name to it, we

say
utter

the word “R”: [W|w]e have thereby given to this

object
thing

a role in our language game, it is now a means of descri[t|p]tion. And the statement, : “If it

didn't exist
were not

, then it could have no name”, ˇnow says as much and as little as, : “If this thing didn't exist, then we couldn't use it in our game.” – What,

as might seem
apparently

must exist, belongs to the ˇis an instrument of language. It palyas plays in our game the role of a paradigmˇ in our game: ;

the role of a standard with which something's compared.
of that with which a comparison is made.

And to state this may be toch makeing an importantch statement. But it is nevertheless a statement concerning our language– , our

method
mode

of describing.

In the description of the language game ˇin № ([4|57]) I said that the colours of the squares corresponded words “r”, “g” etc., correspond ed to the colours of the squares. But what's does this correspondence consist in how far ˇin what sense can one say that certain colours of the squares cor[e|r]e[p|s]pond to these signs[,|?] ˇFor [T|t]he explanation in ([4|5]7) only made a connection between these signs and certain words in our ˇordinary language (the names of colours). – Well, it was assumed that the use of the signs was taught

differently
otherwise

in the ˇactual game

–
, namely

by pointing to paradigms. Quite[,| ;] – but what does it mean to say that in the practice of the language certain elements correspond to the signs? – Does it consist in th[e|is], fact that

the person
whoever is

describing the complex of coloured squares always says “r” where there is a red

red square, “b” where there is a black square, etc.? But what if he makes a mistake in his description and wrongly says “r” where [r|t]here is a black square; what's is then the criterion that shows that here for this was a ˇbeing a mistake? – Or does the fact th[t|a]t “r” indicates “[“|‘]r[”|’]'s indicating standingch for ˇstands for” a red square” consist in the fact, ◇◇◇ mean that the people who use the language always have a red square before their minds when they use the sign “r”?
In order [t|T]o see more clear[e|l]y we have should here, as in innumerable ˇa great number of similar cases, to keep look at the details of the processes what really happens in detail before our eyes

; as it were, from close by.
, to observe from close at hand what happens.

If I am inclined to assume ˇtake the view that a mouse comes into existence is produced springs, by spontaneous generation,

from
out of

grey

rags
scraps

and dust, then it will be well to examine these

rags
scraps

carefully to see how a mouse could have concealed itself in them, how it could

have got
come

there etc.. If, however, I am convinced that a mouse cannoch'cht

be generated from
just come into being out of

these things, then this examination may be superfluous.
ˇBut we have yet got to see [W|w]hat it [k|i]s, however, that hinders, in ˇdoing philosophy, such an examination of makes it so difficult to scrutinize these details,. is something we have yet to come to understand. // to see what it is that sets itself against our scrutinizing these details, when we are doing philosophy. //

Now there are various possibilities for

the
ourch

[a|l]anguage game ˇ◇◇◇ (47), various cases in which we should say a sign names ˇindicates in the game ˇindicates a square of such and such a colour. We [sh|w]ould say this,

e.g.
for instance

, if we knew that the people who use this language were taught the how to use of the sign in such and such a way. Or if [t|i]t were laid down in writing, say in the form of a table, that this elements corres corresponds to this si[ng|gn], and if this table were used in teaching

teaching the language and were brought in [o|t]o decide certain disputed points. – But we

can
c

imagine also that ˇsuch a table of this sort is

an
a regular

instrument in the use ˇpractice of the language. The description of a complex takes place thus in this way:

h
The person

describing

a
the

complex carries

the
a

table with him, looks up in it each element ˇin it of the complex and passes in the table from the elem[t|e]nt to [h|t]he sign (and the person to whom the description is given may also use a table to translate the words of it ˇthe description into the sight ˇpictures of ˇthe coloured squares.) We might say that th[e|is] table ˇhere assumes the role here

which
that

is played in other cases by memory and association. (We [sh|w]ould not in generally carry out

an
the

order, “Bring me a red flower”, by looking up the colour ˇcalled ‘red’ in a

colour-atlas
colour table

and then bringing a flower of the colour that we f[i|o]und in the table; but if it is ˇit was a question of we have to selecting, or mixing, a particular shade of red, then it

may
does sometimes

happen that we we do make use of a sample or a table.)
If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the language game, then

we
one

can say that what we call a rule of

a
the

lan language game can

play
have

very different roles in the game.

Think only of what the ˇsort if cases are in which we say that a game is played according to a particular rule.
The rule may be an aid to instructi[on|ng] ˇpeople in the game. The

pupil
person learning

is told the rule and is trained

to apply it.
in its application.

– Or it is an

implement
instrument

of the game itself. – Or:

a
ach

rule is used neither in instruction ˇteaching the game nor in the game itself; nor is it

included
laid down

in a book of rules. You learn the game by watching how others play ◇ it. But we say it is played according to such and such rules

rules,

for
because

a person watching ˇthe game

could
can

derive
read off

these rules from the practice of way the gameˇ is played, like a natural laws which the actions of the

players obey
game follow

. – But how does the observer distinguish, in this case, between a correct mistake on the part of the a players and a correct action in the game? There are signs characteristic signs for this in the behaviour of the players. Thi[s|n]k of the ch[r|a]racteristic behaviour of someone who has made a slip of the tongue corrects a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to

recognise
know that someone was doing

this [v|e]ven if we didn't understand his language.

“What the names of

a
the

language stand for must be indestructible, for we must be able to describe the

state of affairs
condition

when
in which

everything

that can be destroyed at all
destroyable

has been destroyed. And in this description there willˇ, of course, be words[;| ,] and what corresponds to them

mustn't
can't

then be ˇhave been destroyed,

or
since otherwise

the wor[s|d]s would have no meaning.” – I must_ n[o|']t saw off the branch on which I'm sitting[.|on].
Now one might indeed object, (at once), that the description itse itself must ˇat any rate make an exception for itself escape destruction. – But what ˇthat which corresp[i|o]nds to the words of the description and so ˇtherefore must not be destroyed if it ˇthe description is true, is [w|t]hat ˇwhich gives the words their meaning, without which they would have no meaning. – But this

person
man

is surely, in one sense, that which corresponds to his name. But he

is destructible,
can be destroyed;

and his name does not lose its meaning when

it's
the

bearer is destroyed. –

That which
What

corresponds to the name, and is that without which it would have no meaning, is

, e.g.,
– for instance –

a paradigm

which
that

is used in the language game in

conjunction
connection

with the name. // That which corresponds to the name and without which it would have no meaning is … //

But what if no such sample

is used in
belongs to

the language, if for

for instance e.g., we remember the colour which a word stands for? “And if we remember it,

that means
then

it comes before our mind's eye when we utter the word. The colour ˇin itself must therefore be indestructible, if it is to be possible for us at any time to remember it.”
But what do we take then as the criterion that we for remembering it correctly? – If we work with a sample instead of with our memory, then we say, on occasion ˇ

sometimes
under certain circumstances

, that the sample has changed its colour, and we judge this by ˇour memory. But may[we|n't] not we,

under
in

certain circumstances, speak also of a darkening

(e.g.)
– for instance –

of our memory image? Aren't we just as much at the mercy of memory as we are of a sample? (For someone might

wish
want

to say, : “If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample.”) Or, say, of a chemical reaction: –

imagine
Supposech

you had to paint a particular colour, its name is “

F
S

”, and it is the colour which you see when you combine the substance S ˇcombines with the substance T under such and such conditions. – Suppose the co[,|l]our appeared to you one day brighter than on another, [sh|w]ouldn't you then, under certain circumstances, say, “I must be mistaken, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday”[,|?] This shows that we do not always

regard
treat

what memory says as the

verdict of the highest court,
highest verdict,

beyond which there is no appeal.

“Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed and so the meaning of the word [“|‘]red[”|’] is independent of the existence of a redt thing.” Certain[y|l]y it has no sense to say that the colour red (hue, not pigment) has been torn up or

smashed
pounded

bits
pieces

. But don't we say, “the redness vanishes”? And don't cling to the

idea
fact

that we can call

redness
it

before our mind's eye when nothing

nothing red exists any more. This is ˇjust as though you were to sa[y|id] that then there is still always a chemical reˇaction which produces a red flame. // This is no different from wanting to say that … // – For what if you can't ˇno longer remember the colour any longer? – If we forget wh[at|ich] colour it is thatch which has this name, then the namech loses its meaning for us; that

means
is

, we can no longer play a

certain
particular

language game with it. And the situation is then compar[i|a]ble to that in which ˇarrives when the

sample
paradigm

, which was an

implement
instrument

of our language, has been lost.

       “I want to call only that a ‘name’ which cannot stand in the connection ‘X exists’”. – And we ˇthus you canno't say ‘red exists’, because if there were no red you could not speak about it.” More correctl[t|y]: If “X exists” amounts to is saying, “‘X’” has meaning”, then it is not a sentence about “X” X but a sentence about our use of [p|l]anguage usage of words, namely viz, the use of the word “X”.
      It seems to us as thoughwe were saying , said something about the nature of red in, saying that the words “red exists” ˇdo not make no sense. It exists just ˇ– as it were – [“|‘]in itself[”|’]. The same idea, – that this is a metaphysical statement about red, – is expressed also when we say that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word “indestructible”.
      But

, as a matter of fact,
actually

we want only to take regard “red exists” only as

the
a

a contradictioncould only be said to lies , if anywhere, might be said to lie in the fact that the sentence looks as though it were speaking

about
of

the colour, whe[r|n]eas whileˇ really , in fact, it is supposed to say something about the use of the word “red”. – In reality ˇIn As a matter of fact, however, we

do
may very well say

say

that such & such a
a particular

colour exists; // In reality, however, it is quite a natural thing to say that a particular colour exists; // and this means simply that ˇthere is something exists that has this colour. And the first expression is not less exact than the second; especially not in the case where [“|‘]that which has the colour[”|’] is not a physical object.

“Names stand only for what is an elements of relaˇlity. “A Name only stands for what is an element of reality. For [W|w]hat cannot be destroye[s|d], – what remains the same throughout all change.” But what is th[at|is]? – While we were

saying
speaking

the sentence already it came into already was before our minds. We expressed

an entirely
a very

definite idea. A particular

picture
image

which
that

we wish
we want

to use. For experience does not show us these elements. We see

parts
components

of something complex things made up of parts (a chair, for instance). We say the back is a part of

a
the

chair, but isch itself made up of various pieces of wood[;| ,] whereas a foot is a simple

part
component

. We see also a whole which changes (which is destroyed) while its

parts
components

remain unchanged. These are the materials out of which we

form
produce

that picture of reality.

ˇNow Suppose If I say now: “

the
mych

broom is standing in the corner”, is this really a statement about the broom

stick
handle

and the brush? At any rate, one

may
might

surely substitute for th[e|is] statement it one which describe[d|s] the position of the broom

stick
handle

and the position of the brush. And ˇsurely this statement is surely a now further more fully analysed. form of the first one. – But why do I call it “further analysed”? –

analysed”? – Well, if the broom is ˇover there, then surely that means that the

broomstick
handle

and the brush must be there and ˇthat they must be in a definite ˇparticular relative positions with reference to one another; and this was ˇbefore , as it were, concealed in the [e|m]eaning of the sentence, before and in the analysed

sentence
form

it is

said
expressed

. Then does So the person who says the broom is standing in the corner means really that the

broomstick
handle

and the brush are ˇare standing there and ˇthat the

broomstick
handle

is sticking in the brush? If we were to asked someone whether he meant th[at|is], he would probably say that he just hadn't thought about the

broomstick
handle

in particular or about the brush in particular. And th[at|is] would be the right answer,

for
because

he ˇdidn't wanted to speak neither about the broomstick handle nor about the brush in particular. Supposeyou were to say to someone, instead of “Bring me the broom”, ˇyou said to someone “Bring me the broom handlestick and the brush

which
that

is attached to it”. Isn't the answer to this, : “Do you want the broom? And why do you express put it in th[at|is] in such an absurd queer way?” // And whay take such an absurd way of saying so? // ” – ˇSo [W|w]ill he understand the more fully analysed sentence better, then ˇin it's analysed form? – This sentence –

we
one

might say – accomplishes the same as the ordinary

one
sentence

, but by a more

tortuous
troublesome

route. – [i|I]magine a language game in which someone

is
was

given orders to bring ˇfetch ˇor to move about certain things objects made up of several ˇwhich are composed of various parts[,|.] or to move them about, or something of the sort etc.. And two methods of playing it: in the one a) the complex things (brooms, chairs, tables etc.) have names, as in (1[3|9]); in the other b) only the parts have names and the whole is described by

means
aid

of them. –

In what way
To what extent

is an order [of| in] the second game an analysed form of an order in the firstˇ analysed? Is the formerch second embedded contained in the latterch first and is it extracted

brought out
extracted

by analysis? – Certainly, you take ˇthe structure of the b[o|r]oom to pieces is reveald if ˇwhen you separate the

broomstick
handle

and
from

the brush; but does ˇit follow that the command to bring the brush consists therefore of corresponding parts?

“But surely you won't deny that a particular command in (a) says the same as one in (b). And what

would you
are you going to

call the second, then, if not an analys[ed|is] from of the first?” – Certainly, I should also say that a command in (a) has the same meaning as a command in (b); or, as I expressed it

before
earlier

, they accomplish the same. And that means: [I|i]f someone ˇI were to show[s|n] me a command in (a) and ask[s|ed], “Which command in (b) has the same meaning as this?”, or, again,ch say: , “Which command in (b) does

it
this one

contradict has the opposite meaning?”, then I

would
should

answer the question in s[y|u]ch and such a way. should give such & such an answer. But this is does not to say mean that we have

an agreement
come to an understanding

about the use of the expression “hav[e|ing] the same meaning” or “accomplishing the same” in general.

// But this is not to say that we now have agreed as to the use of, in general, of the expressions …
// … that we have come to a general understanding about the use of the expression … //

For one

may
might

ask: In what case do we say, “th[o|e]se are only two different f[ro|or]ms of the same game”?

Suppose that the person to whom the commands ˇin (a) and ˇin (b) are given has to look up in ˇis has to refer to a table ˇin which that correlates names with ˇcorrespond are correlated to pictures before he brings

the object
what is demanded

a
the

command. (In the same way one can say of certain things that their purpose is

such and such
so and so

. What is essential is [h|t]hat th[at|is] is a lamp, that

that it's is used for lighting, – that it decorates the room, fills an empty space, etc., is not essential. But essential and unessent unessential are_ n[o|']t always clearly separated.)

But the expression, “ˇthat saying that “a sentence in (b) is an analys[ed|is] form of one ˇa sentence in (a)” ˇin an analysed form, ˇcan easily misleads us into thinking that th[e|is] first form is the/more fundamentalˇ one; ˇthat it reve[la|al]s for the first time what is meant by the other[,| ;] etc.. We thinkrather: that anyone the man who possesses has knows only the unanalysed form ˇsentence, is in want ˇshort of

an
the

analysis. – But may can't I not say that the latter person

misses
loses

an aspect of the matter, just a much asch the former does?
Let's us suppose alter the game ˇin ([4|5]7) altered so in such a way so that the [g|n]ames in it [r|d]on[o|']t stand for squares of a single colour but for rectangles consisting of two such squares. One of these rectangles of the form ⬓, half red, half green,

is
would be

called “u”; one, half green, half white, “v”; and one, half white, half black, “w”. Might Couldn't we not imagine people who had names for such colour-combinations but not for the individual colours? Think of the cases in which we say, : “This

combination
arrangement

of colours (e.g. the tricolourˇ for instance) has a

peculiar
very special

character”. of it's own”.
To what extent are Should we say that With what right can it be said that the signs of this language game in still need of to be analys[is|ed] analysis? In fact, to what extent can ˇthis game ([4|5]7) be substituted replaced for this one by the game one in (57)? – It is in fact a different language game;

although
even though

it is related to ˇthe game ([4|5]7).

And [H|h]ere we come up against the big question

lying
that lies

behind all these considerrations ˇthe enquiries we have been making: [F|f]or one might

say
object

to me: “You're tak[e|ing] it easy! You talk

of
about

all sorts of language games, but you have

have never said what it is that's is essential

about
to

an language game, and th[at|us] means to language[.|;] [W|w]hat's it is that is in common to all these

procedures
processes

that
andch

makes ˇus call them languages, or parts of

a
the

language. You treat yourself to precisely ˇThat means you now don't bother now about that part of the enquiry, therefore, which at one time gave you the greatest

difficulty
puzzlement

, namely that concerning the general form of the proposition.” and of language.”
And th[at|is] is true. – Instead of

pointing out
stating

something which is in common to all that we call language, I say there is

nothing
no one thing

in common ˇto these phenomena on account in virtue of which we ˇthat makes us use the same name ˇword for all of them, – they are

akin
related

to one each another in many different ways. And

because
on account

of this

kinship
relationship, or these relationships,

we call them all “languages”. I

shall
will

try to explain this.

Let us [C|c]onsiderfor a moment , e.g., the processes that which we call “games”,. for instance. I mean

board-games
games played on a board

, card games, ball games, ˇathletic contests in the ring prize fighting, etc.. What is ˇin common to all these? – Don't say, : “there must be something ˇin common to themˇ all,

or
otherwise

they would_ n[o|'] be called ‘games’”; – but look and see whether something is in common to all of them. –

For
Because

if you look at them, though you

won't
will not

see something ˇanything that's common to all of them, but you will see similatities, connections, – a

whole lot
long string

of them. As I sa[y|id]: don't think, but look. – Look

e.g.
for instance

at the ˇboard games played on a board, with and their various connections ˇsimilarities between them. Now pass to card games; here you ˇwill find many points of

analogy similarity
correspondence

to ˇbetween this group and the first class[,| ;] but many

common
characteristic

features disappear, and new ones appear. If you now pass to ball games, much that

there was in
is

common remains, but a

great deal
lot

is lost. – Are they all [“|‘]amusing[”|’] ‘entertaining’? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there

always
in every case

such a thing as winning and losing or

a competition
rivalry

between the players? Think of the games of patience[.|s]. In ball games there is wi[ll|nn]ing and losing, but

when
if

a child ˇis throw[s|i]ng bouncing the a ball against the a wall and catch[es|ing] it, again

there is no winning and losing
this feature has disappeared

. See what Look at the part ˇwhich skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill (inch a game of) chess and skill in (a game of) tennis. ˇNow [T|t]ink now of round ˇsinging & dancing games: here

we have
there is

the element of

entertainment
amusement

, but how many othe of theo other characteristic features have disappeared! And soch ˇin this way we may go through the many, many other groups of games[.| –] Watching seeing similarities

appear
show themselves

and disappear.
And now the result of these

observations
considerations

is: [W|w]e see a complicated netˇwork o[d|f] similarities which overlapping and crossing one each another. Similarities in ˇthe large respects and in ˇthe small.

I can[no|']t characterize these similarities better than by the

expression
word

“ find

a more appropriate
a better

word
name

for these similarities than “family

likenesses
similarities

”; for th[at|is] is

how the
the way the different

similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the members of a family: build,

features
facial characteristics

, ˇthe colour of the eyes,

gait
walk

, temperament, etc. etc..– And I shall say the [“|‘]games[”|’] constitute a family.
And in the same way the kinds of numbers

(e.g.)
, for instance,

constitute a family. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perha[s|p]s because it has a – (direct) – kinship

to some
with many

things which, ˇup to the present, we have ˇbeen called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it receives an ˇgets related indirectly connection with to other [w|t]hings which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as we twist fibre on fibre in spining spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the

through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.
But if someone wished were to sa[y,|id]: “Then there is something ˇin common to all these

objects –
creations;

viz.
namelych

the disjunction of all these common

properties
features

”, then I should answer: Here you're are

just
merely

playing with a w[r|o]rd.

You may
One might

just as well say: something runs through the

whole
entire

thread

–
, namely

the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

“All [r|R]ight; then for you the concept of number is

explained
defined

as the logical sum of these these single, related ˇinterrelated concepts

–
◇

cardinal number, rational number, real number, etc.

–
◇

and in the same way the concept game as the logical sum of

such & such
the corresponding

partsub-concepts.”

–
–

That needn't not beˇ so. For

we can
I may

give the concept “number” fixed boundaries in this waych, i.e. use the word “number” only to stand as a name for a firmly delimited concept,ˇ with fixed boundaries, but

we can
I may

also use it in such a way that the its extension of the concept is not

fixed
closed

by a boundary. And th[at|is] is

how
the way

we in fact use the word “game”.

In what way
For how

is the concept of a ‘game’

circumscribed
closed

? What is still a game and what is no longer one? ˇWhen does

something
it

begin to be a game, and when does it cease to be one? Can you state the boundaries? ˇsay where the boundary-lines are? No. You can draw some

some
boundary-lines

; for there aren't any drawn ˇas yet. (But th[at|is] has never bothered you, when you have used the word “game”.)
“But then surely there are no rules for the use of the wordˇ is not regulated, the ‘game’ which we play with it

is not regulated
has no rules

.” – It is not

bounded
limited

at every point by rules; but there is aren't any also no rulesˇ, say, for how h[g|i]gh you may throw

a
thech

ball in tennis,

e.g.
for instance

, or how hard, yet tennis is surely a game and it does have ru[e|l]es.

How would you explain to somebodyone what a game is? I imagine you would describe games to him, and you might conclude your

your description with, “all th[at|is] these and the like we call games”. And do you know anych more yourself? Is it

just
perhaps only

that you can't

explain to
tell

the other

man
person

exactly what a game is? But th[at|is] is_ n[o|']t This, however, is n[o|']t ignoranceˇ, however. You don't know the boundaries because none are drawnch. As I sa[y,|id,] you may– , for some purpose or other– , draw a boundary.

But is this necessary to in order to make it into a useful concept?
Do you thereby make it possible for the first time to use the concept?

Not in the least

Not at all
By no means

, – unless it be ˇyou mean, useful for th[at|is] particular purpose. Just as little as the unit of length “1 pace” was ˇnot

useless
ˇgiven a proper use for

the first time

when someone
by the person who

gave the definition, : “1 pace = 75 cm”. And if you say, : “but before that surely it wasn't an exact unit of length”, , then I answer: all right, then it was an [u|i]nexact one. – – Although you haven't yet given me

a
the

definition of exactness.

“But if the concept ‘game’ is

, in this way, unbounded
unlimited in this way

, then you don't really know what you mean by ‘game’.” – If I give the descriptio description, : “The ground was covered with

plants
flowers

”, will you say that that I don't know what I am talking about

as
so

long as I can't give a definition of a plant?
Socrates (in ): “You know it and can speak

Greek
Hellenic

, so ˇsurely you must surely be able to say it.” – No. To [“|‘]know it[”|’] does not mean here to be able to say it. Th[at|is]ch is_ n[o|']tˇ, here, our criterion of knowing here.
An explanation of what I

meant
mean

would be, say, a painted picture and the words, : “[T|t]h[at|is] is roughly what the ground looked like”. But I may say also, : perhaps I say: “Th[at|is] is exactly what it looked like”. – Then were exactly these ˇblades of grasses and leaves in these positions there? No, th[at|is] isn't what it means. And I [w|sh]ould should not recognise any picture as

a[s|n] exact ˇone in this sense.

might
may

say the concept “game” is a concept with

blurred
hazy

edges. – “But is a

blurred
hazy

concept a concept at all?” – Is an indistinct blurred photograph a picture of a

man
person

at all? – In fact, can one always is it always ˇdesirable to replace an indistinct photograph picture by a distinct sharp one to advantage? Isn't what is an the indistinct ˇone often just

what
the thing

we want?
Frege compares the concept

to
with

a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you could cannot call a district at all. Th[at|is] means,

I suppose
no doubt

, we couldn't do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, “

Stand
Stay

roughly
approximately

there”? Imagine I were was standing stood yourself standing ˇ in a street with another person in a place someone ◇◇◇ and sa[id|ying] this. In doing so saying it I shall you will not draw any even draw any boundary, but rather just make say a pointing movement with my hand, gesture – just exactly as though I you were pointing

at
to

a particu[,|l]ar

spot
point

. And

this is how
in just this way

we may explain ˇto someone, say, what a game is. We give ˇhim examples and want them in a certain sense to be understoodˇ in a certain way. – But with b[h|y] this expression when I say this I do not mean: that he is

now
supposed

to see what is ˇin comm[l|o]n in ˇto all these examples, – ˇ, the common factor being one which, for some reason or other, I could not ˇ

am
was

unable to

point out
express

ˇ – but ˇI mean that he is now to use these examples in a particular way. Giving examples is ˇhere not ◇◇◇ an indirect

way
means

of explaining, – in ˇused for want of a better one. – For any general explanation can be misunderstood too ˇ as well. , ˇjust as examples can. – That's just is how we play the gameˇ is played. (I mean the language game with the word “game”.).

Seeing what is ˇin common: Suppose I show someone various a coloured pictures comic and say,: “The colour which you see in all of them these pictures is called ‘ochre’.” – Th[at|is] is an expllanation explanation which the other person is underst[an|oo]ds when he looks and sees by finding what ˇit is ˇthat's in common to th[o|e]se pictures. He can then

look
gaze

at what is this commonˇ element, or point to it.

to it.

Compare with th[at|is]: – I show him

polygons
rectangles

of various shapes, all painted with in the same co[k|l]our, and say, : “What th[i|e]se have in common with one another is called ‘ochre’”. –
And compare with th[at|is]: – I show him samples of various shades of blue and say, : “The colour which is common to ˇthem all I call ‘blue’”.

If someone explains to me the names of the colours by pointing to samples and saying, : “This colour is called ‘blue’, th[ei|is] ‘green’,” etc.”, then this case

can be compared
is comparable

, in many repsects,

to the case where
with that in which

he gives me a table in which the words

stand
e

under the samples of colours, – although this comparison may be misleading us in various ways. – One is Now we are inclined now to extend th[e|is] comparison: [T|t]o have understood the explanation means to have in mind possess a concept,ˇ, in your mind,, of what ˇthat which has been explainedˇ in your mind, and that is[:|(]ˇto possess a sample or a picture image[.|)] – ˇso [I|i]f someone shows me various leaves and says, : “Th[at|is] is what's we called a ‘leaf’[”| ”], then I get ˇobtain a concept of ‘the

‘shape
form

of a leaf’, an image picture of it, in my mind. – But what does

a picture
the image

of a leaf look like which has no ˇdoesn't have any particular shap[w|e] ˇof leaf but rather [“| ‘]that which is ˇin common to all shapes of leaves[”| ’]? What ˇis the colour has the ˇof my mental sample in my mind of the colour green, – i.e., of that which is common to all shades of green?
“But

coudn't
mightn't

there be such a ‘universal’ sample[?|s?] Say a diagram of a leaf, or a sample of pure green.” – Certain[,|l]y. – But the fact that this diagram is understood as a diagram and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and that

a
the

coloured square of pure green is understood as a sample of everything that is greenish and not as a sample

of
for

pure green: that lies again in the way in which these samples are used. applied.

used.

⋎

Connected with this is
This is also where we find

the idea that the person who if someone sees this leaf drawing as a sample for of the shape of a leaf in general, he sees it differently from

someone
the person

who sees it as a sample

of
for

this particular shap[w|e].

Well
And

that might in fact be so; although but (though, in fact, it isn't) –,

and
since

it would mean only that experience shows that

someone
a person

who sees the

drawing
leaf

in a particular way then

applies
uses

it in such and such a way, or according to such and such rules.
There is of course such a thing as seeing ˇsomething in one way and in anotherˇ way, and there are also cases in which

a
the

person who sees

a
the

particular sample

in this way
thus

will

, in general,
generally

use it in this ˇsuch & such a way, and whoever ˇa person who sees it differently, in a different way. Anyone who If someone sees the drawing

as a plane figure consisting of a square and two rhomb[s|i], ˇhe will

probably
perhaps

carry out the command, : “Bring me something

like this
of that sort

”, differently from the person who sees the picture spatially in as having three dimensions.

What does it mean◇, to kn[w|o]w what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be ab[e|l]e to say it? Is this knowledge some equivalent of a definition

which
that

is not uttered unuttered?

Such
So

that, if it were uttered, I might recognise it as the expression of my knowledge? Is_ n[o|']t my knowledge, my concept, of a ‘game’, expressed entirely in the explanations

which
that

I could
I might

give? namely in the fact that I desc describe In describing examples of various kinds of games, ˇin showing how you can construct all sorts of other games in analogy with these ˇanalogous to these in all sorts of ways, in saying that I should hardly call so and so a game any more[,| ;] such & such, games; and so forth.

If someone were to had drawn a sharp boundary, then I couldn't not

acknowledge it
recognise this

as the one

which
that

I ˇtoo had also always wanted to draw, or had ˇas the one I had drawn in my mind. For I didn't never wanted to d[ar|ra]w any one ˇat all. We

can
may

say

in this case:
then that

his concept is not the same as mine, but

akin to
connected with

it. And the connection ˇrelationship between them is that of two pictures of which one consists of coloured

patches
spots

without sharp boundaries, the other out of coloured

patches
spots

similarly shaped and distributed, but

having
with

sharp boundaries. The

similarity
connection

then
ˇin this case is

as undeniable as the difference.

And, if we take to extend this comparison, still a bit further, then it is clear that the degree to which the sharp can picture can be similar to resemble the indistinct one, depends on the degree of indistinctness

of
in

the latter. For suppose you had an indistinct picture and had to

draw
sketch

a [“| ‘]corresponding[”| ’] sharp picture. In the

first there
former

is an indistinct blurred red rectangle; you replace it by a sharp one. Of course – various such sha[p|r]p rectangles might be drawn which to co corresponded to the

blurred
indistinct

one. – But if in the original the colours

merge
run

into one another without

◇ a
any

trace of a boundary, then will won't it not

become
be

isn't it then a hopeless task, to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the

blurred
indistinct

one? Won't you then have to say, : “Here I might just as well draw a circle as a rectangle, or a heart shape; all the colours run into one another just anyhow.; [E|e]verything, and's correct, and nothing[,|'s] – is correct.” – And this is the position in wh[c|i]ch anyone you finds himself, for instance, yourself, if, e.g., who searches for definitions in in aesthetics or in ethics which correspond to our concepts.
Always ask yourself, in this difficulty: “How did we learn the meaning◇ of this word – ‘g[ut|ood]’, for instance? By what examples; in which language games? ◇ You will then see m[r|o]re easily that the word must have a family of mean[k|i]ngs.

Compare: knowing and saying

Compare

:
,

knowing and saying
how many

feet
meters

hight Mont-Blanc is; –
how the word “game” is used; –
what a clarinett sounds like.
The person [Anyone|Anyone] who is amazed that anyone you can ˇwonders how it is possible to know something and not be able to say it

may be thinking
thinks perhaps

ˇis thinking possibly of a case like the first. Certainly not of one ˇa case like the third.

Consider this example: If someone says, : “Moses

didn't
did not

exist”, then that can mean this can have different sorts of things meanings. It may mean: the [i|I]srealites did_ n[o|']t have one leader when they

left
journeyed out of

Egypt – or: their leader was not called Moses – or; : there ˇnever was nbody nobody that anyone who did all

that
the things that

the Bible records of Moses – etc., etc.. – According to In Russell's ˇterminology we may say: the name “Moses” can be defined by various descriptions.

E.g.
For instance

, as “the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the daughter of Pharoah Pharao”, etc.. And according as we take the one or the other definition the

sentence
proposition

“Moses existed” gets a different

sense
meaning

, and similarly with every

sentence
proposition

which treats of Moses. – And if someone

tells
says to

us, : “N did_ n[o|']t exist”, do we

really
also

askˇ questions like, : “What do you mean? Do you wish to say that … , or that … , etc. etc.?”
But if I make a statement about Moses, am I always prepared to substitute any one of these descriptions for “Moses”? I shall say, perhaps,: that – by “Moses” I

mean
understand

the man who did what the

the Bible records of Moses, or at any rate

much
a lot

of it. But how much? Have I come to any deci[sion|ded] as to how much ˇof it must

turn out
be shown

to be false in order that I should

give up
abandon

statement
proposition

as falsech? So Has ˇis my use of the name “Moses” for me them a fixed and clearly unambiguously determined use in for all possible cases? – Isn't it like this, that I have,

as it were
so to speak

, a whole

lot
row

of props in readiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another shou[d|l]d be withdrawn ˇtaken from under me, and vice versa? – Consider still yet another case: If I say, “N has died”, then the position with as regards to the meaning of the name “N” may be this: I believe that a person lived whom I (1)

saw
have seen

in such and such a place[,|s,] who (2) looked like this and this (pictures), (3) did such and such ˇthings, and (4) in the social world

had the name
bears this name

“N”. ˇIf [A|a]sked what I

mean
understand

by “N” I should enumerate all th[at|is] these things, or some of itˇ them, and different things ones on different occasions. My definition of “N” would ˇthus be, then say: “the man of whom all th[at|is] is true”. – But suppose something in of it should turns turned out to be false, – – should shall will I be prepared to declare the

sentence
proposition

“N has died” false, – even if ˇonly ˇthough something which that ˇthat to me seeme[d|s] to me

quite inessential
incidental

turn[e|s]d had turned out to be false? But where is the limit of what's is

inessential
incidental

? – If I had Had I, in such a case, given an explanation of the name in such a case, then I

would
should

now be prepared to

alter
changech

it.
And we may express this by saying: ˇcan be expressed thus: I use the name “N” without a

firm
settled

ˇrigid meaning. (But th[at|is] no more impairs its use tha[t|n] it impairs impairs the use of a table that it stand[s|ing] on four legs instead of on three and so on occasion ˇthough occasionally such a table wobbles.)
Ought

we
one

to say that I use a word whose the meaning ˇof which I don't know and so talk nonsense ˇthus what I say has no sense? – Say what you like, so long as this doesn't not prevent you from see[k|i]ng what the situation is. (And if you

you see th[at|is], then there are

some
a good many

things you won't say.)

I say: “There's is a chair over there”; what if I walk over to ˇfetch it and want to it and want to take it and it suddenly vanishes from my

sight
view

? – “Then it wasn't a chair, but some illusion or other.” – But in a few seconds we see it again and can

touch
take hold of

it, [t|e]tc..– “

So
Then

the chair was there after all and its

disappearance
vanishing

was some sort of illusion.” – But suppose that after a time it disappear[s|ed] again, – or seem[s|ed] to disappear. – What ought we to say now? Have you ˇgot rules ready for such cases, which say whether one may ˇstill call such a thing ˇis still to be called a “ch[ir|ai]r”? But are they lost to us in our do we miss them when we use of the word “chair”; and ought we to say that we rea[,|l]ly ˇdon't attach no ˇany a meaning to this word,

as
since

we are not provided with rules for all ˇthe possibilities of its application?

Ramsey once insisted, in a discussion with me, ˇstressed the point that logic is a [“| ‘]normative science[”| ’]. ˇI can't say, [E|e]xactly, what idea he had in mind, I don't kn[w|o]w; but it was undoubtedly closely

related to that
connected with one

which dawned on me I only laterˇ got hold of: – namely that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, ˇor with calculi

having
, according to

fixed rules, but ˇthat we can[no|']t say that whoeverch uses language must play such a game. – But if ˇIf, however, you say that our expression of languages only approximates to such a calculi, then you stand

right at
immediately on

the edge of a misunderstanding. For this ˇthus it may make it seem as though in [L|l]ogic we spoke about an ideal/language. As though our logic were ˇwas, so to speak, a logic, as it were, for empty space a vacuum ˇnot taking into account friction & air-resistance. Whereas actually logic does_ n[o|']t treat of language – (or ˇof thought) – in the sense on in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and

all
the miost

one can ˇmight say would be ˇis that we construct ideal languages. But here ˇto use the word “ideal”

“ideal” ˇhere would be misleading; since it would then ◇pe◇ seem

that
as though

it suggests for this would make it appear as though thes_ e languages

are
werech

better, more perfect, than our everyday language; ˇand as though a logician were needed to show

us,
people

after all
at last

what a correct

sentence
proposition

[,|l]ooks like.
But that ˇall this can only appear in the correct light when we have

reached greater
gained

clarity concerning the ideas of understanding,

meaning
supposing

and thinking. For then it will also become get clear what may mislead one– , and did has mislead me (Tract.atus Log.ico-Phil.sophicus), – into thinking that whoever utters a sentence and means, or understands, it is thereby working doing ˇis using a claculus according to definite rules.

What do I call the “rules according to which he proceeds”? [t|T]he hypothesis which describes satisfactorily his use of the words as we observe it[?|,] or the rules which he looks [j|u]p

in
as he is

using the signs, or ˇthe rule whichh he gives as an answer when we ask him what his rules are is? But what if ˇour observation does_ n[o|']t show ˇus clearly any rules, and the question doesn[n|']t

elicit one
bring any to light

? – For although he did g[i|a]ve me an explanation when I asked ˇin answer to my question, what he understood meant by “N”, he ˇbut he was prepared to

withdraw
retract

this explanation and alter it. –

So how
How then

shall I determine what the reel[s|e] are according to wh[c|i]ch he plays? [h|H]e doesn't know them himself. – Or more correctly: [W|w]hat is ˇuse is there in this case for left for the expression, “rule accordi[g|n]g to which he plays”, supposed to mean here?

Doesn't the analogy of language with a game throw

any
some

light here? For we can easily imagine that people might [i|a]mus[e|ing] themselves in a field ˇon a lawn common by playing with a ball in this ˇsuch a way: ˇthat they beginning various

them existing games
existing games (with their rules)

not finishing some of them
leaving a number of them unfinished unfinished

, in between ˇwhiles throwing the ball ˇup at random in the air,

chasing ˇand hitting one each another in fun with the ball, throwing it at one another etc..– And now someone ˇcomes along and saysch if someone said: that during the whole : all the time th[e|ese] people are playing a ball game and conf[i|o]rm to a definit[i|e]w rule with every throw. therefore at every point act according to definite rules.
And isn't there also the case in which we play and “make up the rules as we go along”? And also that in which we alter them “as we go along”.

In ([6|7]5) I said of the

usage
application

of the word “game” that it is not

‘
“

limited
bounded

at every point by rules

’
”

; but what does a game look like

which
that

is bounded at every point b[h|y] rules? Whose The rules ˇof which don't let no in any doubt penetrate;, stop ˇup all the holes for it? – Can't we

imagine
think of

a rule which regulates the application of

a
the

rules? ; and a doubt which that rule removes, – and so forth?
But th[at|is]

doesn't mean
is not to say

that we ˇare in doubt

–
, –

because we can imagine a doubt. I can well imagine that someone is always in doubt before he opens the door of his house ˇas to whether a chasm may not have opened on the other side of it; and that he makes certain

of it
about it

before he steps through the door (and ˇone day it may sometime prove that he was right); but I am not, therefore, ˇmyself in doubt in a similar case. myself.

A rule

stands
is

there, like a sign post. Does

the sign post
it

leave no doubt

as to
about

what
the

[;|p]ath I have to take? Does it show in what direction I

have
am

[o|t]o go when I have passed it? ; whether

along
by

the road, or the field along the footpath, or

over hedge & ditch
accross country

? But where does it say in what sense I

ought
have

to follow it; whether in the direction of the hand or, e.g., in the opposite one ˇdirection? – And in insetad suppose instead of one sign post there w[er|as]e a closed chain of sign posts, or chalk marks

running
ran

along

along the ground; : is there only one ˇway of interpret[ati|ing]on for them? – Then ˇTherefore I

can
may

say the signs- post surely doesn't leave any doubt. Or more correctly rather: [I|i]t sometimes leaves a doubt, ˇand sometimes not ˇdoesn't. And this is_ n[o|']t ˇany longer a philosophical proposition; any more longer, but an it's an experiential proposition.

Let Imagine a language game like ˇthat in (5) ([3|4]) be played with the help of a table. The signs which A gives ˇto B are no[t|w] written characters[:| .] B has a table: in the first column are the w[t|r]itten characters

which
that

are used in the game, in the second ˇcolumn pictures of ˇthe different types of buildings

blocks
stones

. A shows B such a written sign (writes itˇ, e.g., on a board tablet, slate say); B

finds it
looks it up

in the table, glances ˇlooks across at the p[c|i]cture that lies lying opposite, [,|e]tc.. The table ˇtherefore is thus a rule which he

follows
conforms to

in carrying out the commands. – The [l|L]ooking up of the a pictures in th[e|is] table is somethingch one's learns by train[in|ed]gˇ in, and a part of this training ˇmay consists perhaps in the pupi[,|l]'s learning to

draw
travle with

his finger ˇacross the table from left to right in the table,, i.e., in his learning, so as to speak it were you might ˇput it, to draw a row of horizontal lines.
Suppose now that various ways of reading a table were int[or|ro]duced; namely once at on[t|e] time sometimes first, as above, according to th[e|is] diagram:

then again,
another time

according to this diagram:

or this:

A diagram of this sort is

appended
added

to the table as ˇand is a rule showing how it ˇthe table is to be used.
But [C|c]an't we now imagine further rules to explain this

rule
one

? On the other hand, was the first tab[e|l]e incomplete without the diagram

And so, are the other (abnormal) tables incomplete without their diagrams?
And are the others without theirs?

Suppose I explain: “By ‘Moses’ I

mean
understand

the man, if such a

one
person

existed, who led the Isrealites out of Egypt[,| ;] whatever he may have been called then his name and whatever else he may have done or not not have done”. But ˇregarding the same sort of doubts is are possible regarding the words of this explanation as ˇare possible there is about the name “Moses” (what do you call “Egypt”, whom do you call “the Isrealites”, etc.). In fact, these questions don't wouldn't even come to an end ˇeven when if we have had reached words like “red”, “dark”, “

sweet
old

”. – “But how

can
canch

an explanation help me to an understanding, then, , if it's isn't never the

ultimate
final

one? ˇThat means [T|t]he the explanation is never finished, then ˇcompleted; I still don't understa[d|n]d, and never will, what he means.” As though an explanation would h[a|u]ng, as it were, in the air unless there were another to support it another ˇone supported it. Whereas although [a|A]n One explanation may rest on another that one has ˇexplanation which has been given, none ˇbut no explanation is in needs of another, – unless we need it in order to avoid a misunderstanding. We

might
may

say: an explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent one, – – one, that is, ˇone which would arise

without that
if there were not the

explanation[,| ;] but not,

any
every

one that I

could
can

imagine.
It

can
may

easily appear as though every doubt showed ˇ

was
were

just
only

a symptom of

some existing
an existing

gap in the foundations, so that a

well-founded
sure

understanding is only

only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

The sign post is in order, – if,

under
in

normal circumstanc[s|e]s, it fulfils its purpose.
If I say to someone, as in ([6|7]8), : “

Stand roughly there
Wait approximately here

”, –

can't
may not

ˇdoesn't this explanation serve [function| work] perfectly? (And

can't
may not

every other ˇexplanation break down too?)

“But i[t|s]n't the ˇit an inexact explanation inexact surely after all?” – Yes, [w|W]hy shouldn't we not call it “inexact”?

But
Only

let'[u|s]s understan[x|d] what “ine[ax|xa]ct” means. For, in the first place, it does_ n[o|']t mean “useless”, otherwise

we should say:
it would mean,

“inexact for this ˇsuch & such a purpose”; in the second pla[v|c]e: – let'[u|s]s consider what as opposed to this inexact explanation we we should call an “exact” ˇexplanation one. Perhaps that of drawing a chalk

line
mark

on the place, of marking off a [“|‘]district[”|’]. – But then it ˇat once occurs to us at once that the ˇchalk line has a breadth;

thus
so that

a colour boundary would be more exact. But does has this exactitudeness ˇhere still have any function here here, doesn't it run idle? And we haven't even determined yet what

we're to call
is to pass as

“crossing the ◇◇◇ this sharp boundary”; how, with what instruments,

this fact
it

is to be established, etc..
We understand what i[s|t] mean[t|s] by to, settingch a watch

to the◇ exact time
exactly to the minuit

, or – regulating it so that it runs accurately. But what if someone should asked: is this exactness an ideal exactness, or how far does it approximate to it? – We

can
may

, of course, talk about of time measurements of time

for
in connection with

which there is a different exactness, and, as we should say, ˇa greater exactness one than there is connection with that of a time measurements by a watch. Where the words “setting it ˇthe clock exactly to the minuit ˇexact time” have a different, although ˇa related, meaning, and the

and where reading the clock is a different process, etc..– If now I say to/someone, : “You ought to come ˇto lunch more puctu punctually to luncheon; you know that

we start
it begins

exactly at one o'clock”, – is it really not really exactness that is being spoken of here, – because someone may say, could you say, there'sis no question of exactness here at all: “think of how the time is

measured
ascertained

in a laboratory, or in an observatory, there you see what ‘exactness’ means◇”?
[I|“]Inexact”, – that's is really an expression of suggests blame, and “exact” and expression of suggests praise. And that's means surely: to say: what's is inexact does_ n[o|']t achieve its aim as completely as what's is more exact. So that it ˇall depends

upon
on

what we call “the “aim”.

Are we being
Is it

inexact if we don't tell the joiner the breadth of the table to 1000th 100

1
1000

of an millimeter inch? Aand if we don't give the distance of the sun to the meter ˇthe nearest foot?
So [T|t]hink therefore of the elastic ways how we strech the use of using the words “exact”, and “ine[a|x]act”. – ˇThere isn't One ideal of exactness is not provided; we don't know what we ought to understand by such a thing'sˇ to be like – unless you yourself stipulate what is to be called so ˇ“the ideal of exactness”. But it you will be ˇfind it difficult for you to

make
hit upon

such a stipulation[;| ,] one

which
that

satisfies you.

With these considerations we are at the place where the find ourselves facing the problem isˇ stands: To what extent is logic, in some way, something/sublime?
For it seemed as though a special depth – ˇa universal significan significance – belonged to logic. As though

logic
it

lay, so to speak, at the foundation of all sciences. – For ˇthe logical meditations investigation searches into ˇinvestigates the essence of a[,|l]l things.

Logic
It

ˇIt wants to get at the root of things, and ought not to

trouble
bother

about whether the things actually happening is this waych or thatˇ way. – It This ˇThe logical ˇinvestigation does not arises not

out of
fromch

an interest in the facts of natur[a|e]l events, nor [r|f]rom the

urg
need of grasping

causal connections.

connections. It springs rather But from the an effort desire our trying to understand the basis ˇfoundation, or essence, of

all that's
everything

empirical ˇexperiential.

Not however
Now

as though we were to hunt out new facts to this end ˇin order to do this we should search for new facts: ont the contrary, it is essential to our enquiry that we don't

wish
want

to learn anything new

by
in

it. it to teach us new facts. We want to understand something which ˇalready lies ˇthere openly to the before our view eyes[.|;] [F|f]or that it's this is [w|t]hat we seem, in some sense, not ˇwe don't seem to understand.
Augustine (Conf. XI/14): “quid est e[gr|rg]o tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.” – Dies könnte man nich You could not say this of a question in natural science (e.g.: how great is the specific

weight
gravitych

of hydrogen).

That which
What

we know when [s|n]omeone noone asks us, but

no longer
don't

know when we have to explain it, is something which we have to recollect. call to our mind. about which we have to remind ourselves (And, obviously, something which, for some reason or other, it is difficult to recollect

recall
ˇcall to our mind

It is as though we had to

see
look

through the phenomena: our enquiry

, on the other hand,
, however,

is is/n['|o]t isn't directed not upon ˇis not one into the phenomena, but rather, – as we might say, – upon into the [“| ‘]possibilities[”| ’] of phenomena. We recollect [t|T]hat's isˇ to say, we call to our mind, the kind o[s|f] statements that we make about the phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements which one ma[k|d]es about the duration of events, about their events pastˇevents, present or future. (Theseˇ statements, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and fu[r|t]u[t|r]e.)
Our

examination
view

ˇinvestigation is th[us|ere]fore a grammatical one. And thisch

examination
view

investigation it brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, namely, which concerning the use of the words of our language, and which are brought about by analogies (which hold﹖) between our ˇdifferent forms of expression. – And one can remove these misunderstandings ˇcan be removed by replacing a certain forms of expression by

by others.

This may be called
We may call this

“analysing” our forms of expression,

for
since

the procedure sometimes bears a resembl[an|es]ce to taking something to pieces. that of an analysis.

Thus it may
It may now

seem, however, as though there

was
werech

something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of speech,

linguistic forms,
expression,

ˇ & therefore one compl[t|e]tely analysed

state of these expressions
form of the expression

. That is: ˇit may seem as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light: // which has to be brought out into the light. // //

if
Once

this

were
has been

done,

language would be
the expression is

completely

clarified
explained

and our problem is solved.

This can be put as follows:
We may put it also in this way:

[We| we] remove misunderstandings by making our expression more◇ exact: [B|b]ut ˇthus it may seem as though we were trying to reach

a
one

particular state, that of perfect exactness; ˇand as though th[at|is]ch were the real aim of our

investigation.
inquiry.

This is ˇwhat's expressed in the question as to the

nature
essence

of language, of

a
the

proposition, of thinking. – For if we try although in our inquiries also [investigations we try are trying|investigations we are trying] to understand the

nature
essence

of language – (its function, its construction structure), – still it isn't that which th[at|e] question has in view. For it ˇthis question does not sees the essence, not in as something that is [which lies|which] already lies open to view [before us| before us], and which by [by a process of|a process of ordering] being put in order becomes visible at a glance. ˇtransparent – I mean capable of being all seen at a glance: [B|b]ut rather ˇas something which lies beneath [under| under] the surface[.|,] Something which lies within[;| ,]

something
which

we see when we

see
look

into
through

the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

“The

nature
essence

is hidden

to us
from us

”: The essence is what's hidden: th[at|is] is the form which our problem takes now. We ask, : “What is language?”, “What is

a
the

proposition?”. And the answer to these questions is [ˇto be| ˇto be] given once and

and for all, and independent of all future experience.

One person might say, : “a prop[l|o]sition, [h|t]hat's is the most everyday thing in the world”; and another person, : “a proposition'[–|s] that's is something very extraordinary ˇqueer – very extraordinary[”|!]” – And this latter person can't

just
simply

look at ˇand find out how propositions

really work
function

, because the forms of our modes the forms of expressions ˇwe use concerning propositions and thinking

stand
are

in his way.

Why

should
do

we say

a
the

proposition is something

queer
extraordinarych

? On the one hand because of the immense

importance
significance

of that falls attaches to it ˇpropositions have. (And th[at|is] is so far it's correct.) On the other hand this

importance,
significance,

and
together with

misunderstandings of ˇconcerning the logic of ˇour language, mislead us into thinking the ˇthat ˇa propositions must perform something a very extraordinaryˇ feat, in fact ˇsomething a uniqueˇ feat. – Because of Through [a|A] a misunderstanding makes it seems it appears

to us
to us

that
as though

a
the

proposition d[oe|id]s does something strange.

[“| ‘]The proposition,

remarkable
an extraordinary

a strange thing![”| ’]: here [this idea|this idea] already we have contains ˇin germ the sublimation of the whole presentation point of view [treatment| treatment]ˇ of

our subject
logic

. The tendency to assume a pure intermediate (immaterial) entity ˇmediating between the propositional

symbol
sign

and the facts[.|;] [O|o]r even ˇthe tendency to [want| try] to purify, sublimate, the propositional sign itself. – For that it is a question involving all happens it's all done by most ordinary things means is something we are ˇin various ways prevented from seeing in various ways For we are ˇin various ways prevented from seeing that no extra

none but
only

trivial things are involved by our forms of expression, which send us chasing after ch[a|i]ma[re|er]as. For that none but trivial & well known things are involved our forms of expression prevent us from seeing, by sending us off ◇◇ chasing …

Or: “Thinking must be something unique.” If we say[,| (]meanch[,|)] that such and such is the case, then ˇwith what we mean we don't stop in what we mean // our meaning // anywhere short of the fact; but ˇwe mean that this and that is so and so. – But we may also express this paradox (which has the form actually of a self-evident statement truism) ˇcan be stated in this way: You can ˇit is possible to think

think what is not the case.

The particular delusion ˇwe here referred to is joined by others from various sides. Thinking, language, now seems to us◇ the unique correlate, picture, of the world. The concepts: proposition, language,

thought
thinking

, world, stand one after another in a row, each all equivalent to the each others. (But wh[at|ere] are ˇ's the use of these words to be used for now? The No language game to be played with them is wanting 's provided in which they[a|']re to be used.)

Thought
Thinking

is surrounded

by
with

a halo n[y|i]mbus. – Its

nature
essence

, – logic, –

describes
presents

an order, – the order a priori of the world, i.e. the order of the possibilities which must be ˇin common to the wor[d|l]d and to thinking thoughtˇ must have in common. But it seems as if ˇthat this order must be extremely simple. It

is
must be

prior to all experience, ˇand must run through

all
the whole ofch

experi[ne|en]ce, no empirical

dimness
muddiness

or uncertainty

must adhere
may stick

to it. [‒ ‒| –] Rather it must be of thep purest crystal. This crystal, however, does_n[o|']t appear as an abstraction, bust but as something concrete, in fact as the most concrete, as it were the hardest,

thing
that

there is.

We are under the delusion that what ˇthat which is special ˇdistinctive, profound, what is essential to us in our

investigation
inquiry

lies in the fact that it ˇour investigation tries to grasp the

incomparable nature
matchless essence

of language. That [s|i]s, the order which holds between the concepts: proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, et[.|c].. This order is a super-order -order

between
between

–

as it were
so to speak

– super-concepts. (Whereas ˇin fact the words “language”, “experience”, “world”, if they have an application must have one just as humble as the words “table”, “lamp” and “door”.)

On the one hand it is clear that every proposition of our language “is in order just as it is”. That is, that we don't

aren't trying to reach
don't strive after

an ideal. As though our ordinary, vague propositions didn't ˇyet have any meaning yet and we had

still
yet

to show what a correct proposition looks like. On the other hand it seems clear that where there is meaning there must be perfect order.

Therefore
So that the

perfect order must be even in the vaguest proposition.
“The meaning of

a
the

proposition – we

are inclined
should like

to say – can certainly leave this or that open, but the proposition must surely have one definite meaning.” Or: “An [“|‘]indefinite meaning’, that would really be no meaning.” Th[at|is] is like saying, : “A boundary

which
that

is_ n[o|']t sharp, that is really no boundary at all”. Thech line of thought here is

something like
roughly

this: [I|i]f I say, “I've locked

him
the man

up in

securely
well

in the room – only one door

was left
remained

open”, then in fact I haven't locked him

up
inch

at all; he only gives the there was only an a illusion pretence of ˇhis being locked

up
inch

We should
One would

ˇhere in such a case be inclined to say here, : “so you didn't do anything nothing's has been done at all”. And yet he did do somethingˇ was had been done. (A boundary

which
that

has a

hole
gap

–

we'ld
one would

likech to say – is as good as none at all. But is th[at|is] really true?)
Consider also this proposition: “The ru[el|le]s of a game can certainly

allow
leave

a certain freedom, but they must

nevertheless
still

be quite definite rules.” That's is as though you

said
were to say

, : “By means of four walls you cann indeed leave a person a certain freedom of movement, but the walls must be perfectly ridgid” – and th[at|is] is_ n[o|']t true. If, however ˇon the other hand, you say, : “the walls may,

of course
no doubt

, be elastic, but then they have

one
a quite

definite elasticity” – what does th[at|is] say further? ? It seems to say that you

must
would have to

be able to state this elasticity; but th[at|is] again is not true. “The thing always has one definite length – whether I know

the length
it

or not”: th[at|is] is really by this we really

really the avowal of ˇa declar[a|e]ation that we attach ourselves to a particular expression. That namely Th[at|e] form of expression which makes uses of makes use of the form of an ‘ideal of exactness’. – [S|s]o to speak as a parameter of the description.

The avowal of a form ˇSuch

an adoption of
a declaration in favour of

a particular form of expression, if it's is expressed in the guise of a

statement
proposition

that treats of about thech objects ˇconcerned (rather t[a|h]an of about si[n|g]ns) must be “a priori”. For its opposite becomes really unthinkable, insofar as there corresponds to it ˇas a form of thought, a form of expression, which we have excluded.

“It surely isn't a game if there is a vagueness in the rules.” – But itns isn't it then a game? – “

Well
Yes

, perhaps you [wi|']ll call it a game, but anyway it isn't a perfect game.” That is ˇ's to say, it' has then s is then impure has then lost its purity adulterated ˇimpurities, and I am interested in

the pure article
that whichch has lost its purity

. But I want ˇBut what I wish to say ˇis: you're misunderstanding the rôle which the ideal plays in your

language
mode of expression

. That is ˇThat is, to say [Y|y]ou ˇtoo would call it a game; too, that is to say, only you're

dazzled
blinded

by the ideal and so ˇtherefore you don't see clearly the real application of the word “game”. (It would be similar if you were to say // [i|I]t is as though you

said
were to say //

, “The area

perimeter
ˇcircumference

of this wheel is really dπ”; – it's has been made so that exactly”.)

ˇThere can't be [A|a] vagueness in logic – we want wish to say. – is something that can't be. We live now in the idea: the ideal “must” be there found lie in reality in reality the real world. – While we don't yet see how it

lies in it
is there

// how it has a place there // , and don't understand the nature of this “must”. We believe

:
, –

it must

lie
be

in the real world, for we

believe to we see it there already
think we already see it there

.
In our thoughts [t|T]he ideal, , sits firm and immovable. You can't step

outside
out of

it. You always have 've got to go back again. There is no outside; outside

you can't breathe
there's no air

. – Whence ˇall this? ˇHow does this queer situation arrise? The idea,, rests sits as

as it were, on our nose ˇsits as ˇlike a pair of spectacles, and whatever we look at we see through

them
it

. It never enters our head to take them off.
How can I understand the

sentence
proposition

now,

when
if

the analysis is supposed to be able to show whatch ˇit is I really understand? – Here the idea of understanding as a

strange
peculiar

mental process enters in.
The strict, andch clear rules of the logical construction of

a
the

proposition appear to us as something in the back ground, –

lodged
embedded

hidden in the medium of understanding. I seem them now already (even thou[h|g]h through a medium) I see them even now (although through a medium), since I understand the sign, mean something

by
with

it. The ideally

rigorous
rigid

construction appears to me as something concrete: – I had used a simile; becaus but because of the grammatical illusion, that to the

genel name
concept word

there corresponds one thing,

that which
what

is in common to all

the
its

objects falling under it, it did not seem to be a simile.

We now have a theory (a [“| ‘]dynamical[”| ’] theory of the proposition, etc.) but it does not

appear
seem

like a theory. ˇFor [I|i]t is a characteristi[s|c] of

such a
this sort of

theory that it

looks at
examines

particular
special

, clearly visible

illuminating
illustrative

case and says, : “Th[at|is] shows the way it always is; this case is the prototype of all cases.” – “Of course[;| ,]

that's how it must be
it must be like that

”, we say, and are satisfied. We have hit come upon found a form of description th[t|a]t presentation which attract[ed|s],

satisfies us
is evident to us

. But it is as though we had no[t|w] seen saw something which lies beneath the surface. // which lies under the surface. //
Now [T|t]his tendency to generali[z|s]e the clear case seems in logic to have its be strictly justifi[ca|ed]tion; : here ˇfor once we seem to be fully justified in conclu[s|d]ing: “If one proposition is a picture, then every proposition must be a picture, for they must all be of the same have the same in nature essence nature.” For we are under the delusion that what is

what is sublime, what is essential in about our inquiry enquiry, investigation it's essential features consists in th[e|is] fact lies in this that it grasps one all comprehending

entity
essence

But

when
if

we believe ˇthat we must find that order, the ideal, in the actual language we easily

get to
reach the stage of

speaking of a [“| ‘]real[”| ’] sign, of searching

looking
ˇlooking

for the real sign, – behind [w|t]hat ˇwhich is ordinarily called ⌊“⌋the sign⌊”⌋. // behind that, namely, which is ordinar ordinarily called “the sign”. // ‒ ‒ For we now

feel the need
long

for something ˇmore purer. The

idea
meaning

(the

nature
essence

) of our

enquiry
study

ˇhere requires here something purer asks for purer objects, of which the strict rules treat are about. The totality of these rules – we imagine – is to constitutes the complete grammar of the

symbol
sign

. The proposition, the word, of which logic treats must be something pure and sharp-cut. We now rack our brains about the essence of the

symbol
sign

. – In fact, [M|m]ustn't Isn't it be the

image
idea

of the word;

or even,
,

the idea at the present moment?

Here it's is difficult

as it were
so to speak

to keep

the head above the water
one s head up

, – to see that we must

stick
keep

to the

objects
things

of ˇour every day thinking, and not to get on the wrong track, where it seems as though we had to describe the

last illusive details
ultimate refinements

, which

again, it seems,
on the other hand

we can't describe at all with our means. It is as though we had to restore a ruined spire spider web with our fingers.

(In these reflections also what is problematic doesn't come from the fact that we haven't yet

got to the bottom of
reached the reason of

the appearances; but rather from the fact that we don't know our way about in the grammar of our mode of expression, the signs, with reference to physical o[v|b]jects.)
But the more accurately we observe actual language, the sharper becomes the

antagonism
conflict

between it and our demand. (The

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.